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POPULAR CONSULTATION AND REFERENDUM IN THE MAKING OF
CONTEMPORARY CUBAN SOCIALIST DEMOCRACY PRACTICE AND
CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY
Larry Catá Backer* & Flora Sapio*

Abstract
The language of democracy and democratic organization is
usually spoken only in the vernacular of liberal democracy. Liberal
democracy, mostly of western origin centers legitimacy of a
political order on open, full, and free election for representatives,
as well as a substantially unregulated civic space in which
individuals and others can engage in political discourse. This
essentially exogenous form of democratic organization has been
increasingly challenged in the 21st century by an alternative
model of endogenous democracy more compatible with states
organized along Marxist Leninist principles. These emerging
forms of endogenous democratic practices have been developed
along two distinct lines, one embedded in developing principles
for Chinese Marxism-Leninism, and the other grounded in the
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history and context of Cuban Leninism. While adherents to
orthodox principles of liberal democracy have rejected any efforts
to consider the plausibility of Marxist-Leninist democratic
practice (principally because it requires suspension of the core
operating principles of liberal democracy, though not its effects),
these emerging alternative forms of democratic organization are
worth serious study, if only because of their potential influence on
the development of the optimal model of developing states. This
article focuses on the development, since the 1959 Revolution, of
a Cuban version of Socialist Consultative Democracy.
The article traces the origins of the contemporary expression of
Cuban Socialist Consultative Democracy in two early attempts by
the revolutionary government to transform the practices of
bourgeoise democracy into something different. These attempts,
one at direct popular affirmation of leadership policies, and the
other an institutionalized system for popular consultation,
emerged in new forms after 2011 and have found their most
complete expression in the complex processes of popular
consultation and popular affirmation that marked the Cuban
constitutional reform process of 2018-2019. What makes this
particularly interesting is the way that it may provide a glimpse
at the development of a set of practices (and the theory seeking to
legitimate its forms) that might provide other developing states
with an alternative path to democratic engagement that
minimizes the risks of traditional liberal democratic practice. The
article starts with context, considering the contours of the
fundamental problem of ordering democracy and its compatibility
with the political model for illiberal states. It then turns to the
development of what will become Cuban Socialist Democratic
models. To that end, it looks to the two principal sources from
which these principles were developed. The first is the
development of mechanisms for popular affirmation of the actions
of the vanguard party; the second is the development of models of
popular consultation under the guidance of the vanguard party
and structured through a representative assembly. Taken
together, these two elements contributed to the production of the
initial or 1.0 version of Cuban Socialist Consultative Democracy.
The article then considers how that more primitive model
developed (along with Cuban Leninist theory) under the
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leadership of Raúl Castro from 2011. It traces the pragmatic and
theoretic developments from early efforts around the development
of the Guidelines for Reform of 2011, through the articulation of a
new political and economic model in 2016, and then emerging in
its current 2.0 form in the elaborate process of popular
consultation and affirmation of the 2019 Cuban Constitution. The
paper covers the challenges, contradictions, and potential for this
endogenous form of democracy.
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INTRODUCTION
The 2019 Cuban Constitutional reform made very public a
development that had been ongoing in Cuba for almost a decade
before.1 That development involved the transformation of
Leninism2 in a way that made a space—however, tentative—for the
participation of the collective in the implementation of the
fundamental political and economic line developed under the
leadership of the vanguard party which served as the “core” of
political authority.3 The development of a transformed theory of
collective and core within Leninist theory has marked one of the
most remarkable changes in Marxist–Leninist theory since the
development first of radical collectivity under Mao Zedong’s
Mervyn Bain, Cuba’s New Constitution is Embodiment of Island’s Unique Brand of
Politics,
THE
GLOBE
POST
(Mar.
8,
2019),
https://theglobepost.com/2019/03/08/cuba-politics-constitution/.
2 Though the terms Marxism and Leninism are often used together, almost as a
single concept, they are actually quite distinct concepts. Marxism might most
usefully be understood as the normative foundations of political systems
grounded in a rejection of mass individual ownership of capital and of political
systems meant to privilege this centering of the division between capital
ownership and labor. For the well-known but arguably little read classic first
contemporary iteration, see KARL MARX, CAPITAL (VOLUME 1: A CRITIQUE OF
POLITICAL ECONOMY) (Friedrich Engels, ed., Samuel Moore, Edwards Aveling &
Ernest Untermann, trans., 2017) (1867). Marxism itself has undergone substantial
development since its initial development by Karl Marx from an explanation of
the sociology and politics of economic organization to a set of fundamental
normative principles through which system (with substantial contextual
variation) of a political-economic model for the organization of states could be
undertaken. Leninism on the other hand speaks to the political system necessary
to replace the system of individual capital ownership and the principles for control
of the political-economic apparatus of state by a revolutionary vanguard to
prepare individuals for the establishment of a society grounded in Marxist
normative principles. See generally LESZEK KOLAKOWSKI, MAIN CURRENTS OF
MARXISM 661-686, 730-777 (P.S. Falla, trans., 2005).
3 See LARRY CATÁ BACKER, CUBA’S CARIBBEAN MARXISM: ESSAYS ON IDEOLOGY,
GOVERNMENT, SOCIETY, AND ECONOMY IN THE POST FIDEL CASTRO ERA (Little Sir Pub.
2018).
1
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Cultural Revolution.4 That was followed by the equally radical
technocratization of the vanguard apparatus which sought to
express the popular collective through an organized and
responsive set of representative state and non–state organs.5 It was
this technocratization and institutionalization of consultation that
has marked the development of Chinese approaches since the time
of the Reform and Opening Up era of Deng Xiaoping’s socialist
modernization gloss on Leninist collectivity.6 The result of these
transformations has been felt within the expression of constitutions
and constitution making.7 But this is constitution making of a very
different sort, and one seeking, in its own way, to develop
structures and principles of democratic governance that accord
with foundational principles of political organization incompatible
with those of liberal democratic states and the national cultures it
advances.
In some sense, all such approaches to democratic ordering must
deal with the management of the relationship of leadership “cores,”
and of the “collectives” they serve.8 For Marxist Leninist systems,
See, e.g., Jiang Shigong, ‘Philosophy and History: Interpreting the “Xi Jinping
Era” through Xi’s Report to the Nineteenth National Congress of the CCP’ ["哲学

4

与历史—从党的十九大报告解读“习近平时代”] The China Story (Australian Centre
on China in the World (CIW) at the Australian National University ) (May 11, 2018)
(Translation by David Ownby. Notes by Timothy Cheek and David Ownby)
Permalink HERE); considered in Larry Catá Backer, Reflections on Jiang Shigong on
“Philosophy and History: Interpreting the ‘Xi Jinping Era’ through Xi’s Report to the
Nineteenth National Congress of the CCP” LAW AT THE END OF THE DAY (June 3, 2018),
https://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/2018/06/reflections-on-jiang-shigongon.html#more.
5 See, e.g., Joseph Fewsmith, Studying the Three Represents, CHINA LEADERSHIP
MONITOR, http://media.hoover.org/sites/default/files/documents/clm8_jf.pdf
(on the reform of the Chinese Communist Party in the era after Mao Zedong).
6 See, e.g., HU ANGANG, CHINA IN 2020: A NEW TYPE OF SUPERPOWER (2011).
7 See, e.g., TOM GINSBURG & ALBERTO SIMPSER, CONSTITUTIONS IN AUTHORITARIAN
REGIMES (Cambridge University Press, 2014); Mark Tushnet, Authoritarian
Constitutionalism, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 391 (2015) (on constitutions and
constitution making in illiberal and Marxist-Leninist States from a conventional
liberal democratic perspective). See, e.g., TONG ZHIWEI, RIGHT, POWER, AND
FAQUANISM; A PRACTICAL LEGAL THEORY FROM CONTEMPORARY CHINA (Brill, 2018);
Larry Catá Baker, Party, People, Government, and State: On Constitutional Values and
the Legitimacy of the Chinese State-Party Rule of Law System, 30 B.U. INT’L L.J. 331-408
(2012) (for a different perspective).
8 On the issue of representation in liberal democracies, see, e.g., JOHN GASTIL, BY
POPULAR DEMAND: REVITALIZING REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY THROUGH
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that relationship is also centered on a dual set of cores and
collectives; but here the core is also a vanguard party in which all
political authority is vested, but which as a consequence owes its
legitimacy to its ability to fulfill its ideologically mandatory
responsibilities to the collectives they serve.9 This clearly is not
democracy in the sense that it is understood in liberal democratic
states.10
Constitutionalism, as the newspapers announce, has
become the commanding ideology of our time. The
DELIBERATIVE ELECTIONS (2000) (“There are two fundamental problems in
American politics. The first is that most Americans do not believe that elected
officials represent their interests. The second is that they are correct.” Id. at 1.); see
also, e.g., Alessandro Bonnano, The Crisis of Representation: The Limits of Liberal
Democracy in the Global Era, 16 J. OF RURAL STUD. 305 (2000). See generally, NADIA
URBINATI, REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY: PRINCIPLES AND GENEALOGY (2006). On the
issue of leadership cores and their relationship to collectives in illiberal systems,
see, e.g., WILLIAM CASE, POLITICS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA: DEMOCRACY OR LESS? 245-63
(2002); see also, XIAOWEI ZANG, ELITE DUALISM AND LEADERSHIP SELECTION IN CHINA
35-54 (2004). The issue is ancient in the West. See, e.g., JOSIAH OBER, MASS AND ELITE
IN DEMOCRATIC ATHENS: RHETORIC, IDEOLOGY, AND THE POWER OF THE PEOPLE (1989);
see also, WALTER STRUVE, ELITES AGAINST DEMOCRACY: LEADERSHIP IDEALS IN
BOURGEOIS POLITICAL THOUGHT IN GERMANY, 1890-1933 (1973).
9 The problem of legitimacy in a political system guided by a vanguard core under
principles of Leninist institutional organization touches on the sensitive issues of
“cults of personality.” On cults of personality in the Soviet Union and Eastern
Europe. See Carol Strong & Matt Killingsworth, Stalin the Charismatic Leader?:
Explaining the ‘Cult of Personality’ as a Legitimation Technique, 12 POL., RELIGION &
IDEOLOGY 391 (2011). Most interesting is Soviet self-awareness of the issue. See also
Nikita Khrushchev, Speech to 20th Congress of the C.P.S.U. (Feb. 24-25, 1956),
https://www.marxists.org/archive/khrushchev/1956/02/24.htm (denouncing
the decades long cult of personality around Stalin; (“While ascribing great
importance to the role of the leaders and organizers of the masses, Lenin at the
same time mercilessly stigmatized every manifestation of the cult of the
individual, inexorably combated [any] foreign-to-Marxism views about a ‘hero’
and a ‘crowd,’ and countered all efforts to oppose a “hero” to the masses and to
the people.”). On cults of personality in China and Vietnam, see, Jeremy T. Paltiel,
The Cult of Personality: Some Comparative Reflections on Political Culture in Leninist
Regimes, 16 STUD. IN COMP. COMMUNISM 49 (1983); see also, Larry Catá Backer,
Crafting a Theory of Socialist Democracy for China in the 21st Century: Considering Hu
Angang’s Theory of Collective Presidency in the Context of the Emerging Chinese
Constitutional State, 16 ASIAN-PACIFIC L. & POL’Y J. 29 (2014). And perhaps more
critically, see, Luwei Rose Luqiu, The Reappearance of the Cult of Personality in China,
33 E. ASIA 289 (2016).
10 See, e.g., Louis Henkin, Constitutionalism, Democracy and Foreign Affairs, 67 IND.
L.J. 879 (1992) (discussing the role of Constitutionalism in American democracy).

2019

POPULAR CONSULTATION AND REFERENDUM

43

principal alternative model, Communism, is dead, and
political leaders who used to wave the banner of
"socialism" to justify authoritarian repression and human
rights violations are silenced. Virtually every state now
has a constitution, and every political leader proclaims
commitment to constitutionalism, to the rule of law.11
Rather in the enhancement of popular participation among
those who do not belong to the vanguard party. That participation
is connected to an enhanced role in the implementation and
organization of the administrative apparatus of the state and the
implementation of political goals and objectives that have been
developed under the leadership of the vanguard. Within MarxistLeninist political organizations, it does represent a significant
opening meant to permit popular engagement without appearing
to signal an (inevitable) movement toward liberal democratic
organization.12 And, of course, that move toward popular
participation has been the great challenge of post-Soviet
Leninism—to develop a robust theory of democratic engagement
that is sui generis and nationally contextual—without at the same
time appearing to be just another sad effort to veil an antidemocratic apparatus (the great failing of the Soviet experiment13
and the great peril for China.14 For China, the evolution of Leninist
theory toward popular participation has involved the development
of the core-collective binary, mediated through the political theory
of the “mass line” (from the people, to the people),15 as a political
foundation for the exercise of leadership by the vanguard.16 For
Cuba, that movement toward democratic ordering has taken its
Leninist system in a different direction. It is that difference in
Id. at 885.
See, e.g., Larry Catá Backer, Chinese Constitutionalism in the “New Era”: The
Constitution in Emerging Idea and Practice, 33 CONN. J. INT’L L. 163 (2018) (discussing
how China coincides “New Era” Constitutionalism with their socialist structure).
13 See, e.g., KOLAKOWSKI, supra note 2 at 849-881.
14 See, e.g., Shannon Tiezzi, The Mass Line Campaign in the 21st Century, THE
DIPLOMAT (Dec. 27, 2013), https://thediplomat.com/2013/12/the-mass-linecampaign-in-the-21st-century/ (noting the danger of ideological campaigns
becoming ritualized or a formality).
15 See, e.g., Graham Young, On the Mass Line, 6 MODERN CHINA 225-240 (1980).
16 See, e.g., Larry Catá Backer, Jiang Shigong 强世功 on “Written and Unwritten
Constitutions” and Their Relevance to Chinese Constitutionalism, 40 MODERN CHINA
119-132 (2014).
11
12
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direction and its connection to principles of popular participation
in governance that serves as this essay’s the object of examination.
This effort toward the construction (at least in theory) of a
socialist democracy (the preferred term among its users), of course,
ought not to be understood as a variation of a lurch toward
democracy17 within the structures and world views of liberal
democracies. The fundamental at the core of liberal democratic
theory that all systems must inevitable transition to liberal
democratic principles as the highest expression of political
community,18 tends to serve as the lens through which Chinese
political and legal theory is understood in the West.19 It informs
approaches to Cuban engagements with the application of
democratic principles within the confines of its own normative
principles.20
Cuba, usually considered a backwater for the development of
robust Leninist theory, or at least merely a quixotic Caribbean
variant of East German Sovietism,21 has since 2011 proven to be
increasingly adept at incorporating aspects of theoretical
developments of post-Soviet Marxist-Leninist constitutionalism.22
Carl Gershman, The New Fight: Cuba and the Movement for Democracy, WORLD
AFFAIRS JOURNAL, Winter 2016; Antonio Rodiles & Erik Jennische, The Mirage of
Transition in Cuba (CATO Institute, ECON. DEV. BULLETIN No. 30, June 27, 2018),
https://www.cato.org/publications/economic-development-bulletin/miragetransition-cub; Darren Hawkins, Democratization Theory and Nontransitions: Insights
From Cuba, 33 COMPARATIVE POLITICS 441 (2001).
18 For purposes of this essay no position is taken on the validity of these premises
or the value of this belief. The point worth emphasizing here is that ideology tends
to color analysis of systems grounded in what, to its believers, might be equally
compelling ideological principles wholly incompatible to those of liberal
democracy.
19 See, e.g., Tom Ginsburg & Yan Lin, Constitutional Interpretation in Lawmaking:
China's Invisible Constitutional Enforcement Mechanism, 63 AM. J. COMP. L. 467
(Spring 2015).
20 See, Nick Miroff, Is Cuba on the Verge of Democratic Reform?, THE WASHINGTON
POST
(Mar.
5,
2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2015/03/05/iscuba-on-the-verge-of-major-political-reform/.
21 See, e.g., Larry Catá Backer, Central Planning Versus Markets Marxism: Their
Differences and Consequences for the International Ordering of State, Law, Politics, and
Economy, 32 Conn. J. of Int’l L 1 (Fall 2016).
22 Again, these terms are not meant to be understood in their sense within a liberal
democratic political model. They are meant, instead, to express the possibility of
17
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More importantly it has appeared successful, despite substantial
resistance from its political enemies abroad, in developing
mechanisms for its implementation through three cycles of
political-economic development in the post Fidel Castro Era.23 It
has also done so despite a singular lack of the sort of robust
theoretical discussions within its own Communist Party apparatus
that has marked developments in China. Ironically, the roots of
Cuba’s own journey toward a form of institutionally embedded
popular participation (again incomprehensible when measured by
the premises of Western liberal democracy), lie in the practices of
the Revolutionary government before it became formally Leninist.
These roots, grafted onto the structures of formal consultation built
into the state apparatus after the first Cuban Communist Party
Congress, have, since 2011, opened the door to what may be
understood now as Cuba’s efforts at Socialist Consultative
Democracy 2.0.
It is in that context that the question of the extent to which
Cuba's authoritarian State is changing or, within some meaningful
context, changing, and by changing inching toward democracy,
becomes more interesting. The answer to this question is ‘Yes!’—
but on its own terms.24 The answer is also ‘No!,’ if measured against
the principles and expectations of liberal democracy.25 To that end,
consider the early efforts of the post-revolutionary regime to
develop structures of mass democratic participation under the
guidance of a leadership core. If we consider the effects of
the recognition and development of democratic principles within the structures of
Marxist Leninist political model. See Larry Catá Backer, Party, People, Government,
and State: On Constitutional Values and the Legitimacy of the Chinese State-Party Rule
of Law System, 30 B.U. Int’l L.J. 331 (2012) (for a discussion in the context of Chinese
Marxist Leninist constitutionalism).
23 See, e.g., Ramón I. Centeno, The Cuban Regine After a Decade of Raúl Castro in
Power, 9 MEXICAN L. REV. 99-126 (2017); CARMELO MESA-LAGO & JORGE PÉREZLÓPEZ, CUBA UNDER RAÚL CASTRO: ASSESSING THE REFORMS (2014); Marc Frank,
Chronology: Raul Castro’s Road to Reform in Cuba, REUTERS (Apr. 13, 2011),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-cuba-reform-chronology/chronology-raulcastros-road-to-reform-in-cuba-idUSTRE73C70C20110413.
24 See Jorge Dominguez, Constitución y Constitucionalismo en Cuba: Introducción al
Dossier y Reflexiones, CUBAN STUD. 45 (2017): 3-13 (for useful reflections).
25 See Robert Post & Reva Siegal, Democratic Constitutionalism, Constitution
Center Whitepaper, available at https://constitutioncenter.org/interactiveconstitution/white-pages/democratic-constitutionalism (for a straightforward
consensus description).
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institutionalizing this mechanism for popular participation in the
tightly managed National Assembly of Popular Power. These
together, we will suggest, constitute Cuba’s efforts to construct an
initial form of Socialist Consultative Democracy (the initial or 1.0
version); an effort that suffered from its own internal failings and
contradictions. We will then turn to the efforts to build on this
architecture after 2011 to develop a revised version that drew on
part practice and experiments and reorganized them in a
distinctively systematic way. This is what we have called Cuba’s
Socialist Consultative Democracy 2.0,26 the most refined expression
of which was evidenced in the Cuban Constitutional Reform
processes of 2018-2019.
We note that the conception of the problem posited, and its
conceptual evolution that follows is highly theoretical, though
hopefully not entirely abstract. More importantly, as we will try to
show, the conceptualization of the problem has generated a
substantial amount of practical approaches but is still in search of a
unifying theory compatible with the Cuban political-economic
model it is meant to serve. We hope to take a step in that direction
here. To take that step requites, at its core, the recognition of a
possibility, within Marxist-Leninist political organization, that
democratic expression might be built along quite different lines
than that deemed inevitable under the principles of Western liberal
democracy. That is, that at least in theory, it is possible to try to
construct system of endogenous democracy—grounded in the
practice of consultation and approbation—in contradistinction to
principles of exogenous democracy on which Western liberal
democracies are founded. Sadly, for Cuba, this theory remains (as
it tends to in Marxist-Leninist systems) far ahead of practice.

A. The Problem—Developing a Possibility of Popular
Participation in Illiberal Constitutional States.

Larry Catá Backer, Flora Sapio, & James Korman, Popular Participation in the
Constitution of the Illiberal State—An Empirical Study of Popular Engagement and
Constitutional Reform in Cuba and the Contours of Cuban Socialist Democracy 2.0, 34
EMORY INT’L L. REV. (forthcoming 2019).

26
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Let us consider the 1st Cuban Communist Party (PCC)
Congress of 197527 as the template for the ideological and
constitutional changes that followed from the 7th PCC Congress in
2016. As we will see in more detail below, most of the structural
elements of the 7th PCC Congress and the forms of constitutional
reform that followed were first attempted in the context of the
development of the PCC's first comprehensive ideological line,28
and the transposition of that line into the 1976 Cuban constitution.
In both cases, significant ideological work of the PCC was
immediately followed by its articulation in the state constitution.
More importantly, in both cases, the process included a wellmanaged intervention of popular engagement and validation. This
included the solicitation of mass reaction to the circulating drafts of
key documents and a popular plebiscite.
What was missing from the 2016-2019 reform effort, including
its constitutional dimension, was what had been a key element of
popular participation—the organization of mass acclamation at a
In Cuba, like China, the Communist Party leadership meets periodically to hear
reports and to pass on changes to policy and the political line. In China,
the National Congress draws together selected delegates from
the CCP's membership base. Attendees are required to elect
candidates to senior party positions, consider the general
secretary's report, and decide on amendments to the CCP's
constitution. While the meeting is the highlight of the Chinese
political calendar, at which the general line for the CCP is
established and celebrated, outcomes have already been
decided before the event, according to Roderic Wye, associate
fellow of the Asia programme at Chatham House. "The
Congress is a celebration of decisions that have already been
taken that we don't know about from the outside [of the party],"
Wye told Al Jazeera.”
David Child, Explained: National Congress of China's Communist party, AL JAZEERA
(Oct. 17, 2017). https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/10/explained-nationalcongress-china-communist-party-171017140021234.html.
28 Within Leninist systems an ideological line includes the policies that will be
followed as an application of the principles of the political-economic system that
will be emphasized in a contemporary context. See Larry Catá Backer, The Rule of
Law, The Chinese Communist Party, and Ideological Campaigns: Sange Daibiao (the
“Three Represents”), Socialist Rule of Law, and Modern Chinese Constitutionalism, 16
TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 29-102 (2006). They have been criticized for the
tendency within some Marxist-Leninist States to use them as a screen behind
which the individual discretion of a leading personality is actually the principal
driver of politics. See, e.g., David S. Law & Mila Versteeg, Sham Constitutions, 101
CALIF. L. REV. 863 (2013).
27
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rally called for that purpose.29 The 1st PCC Congress and the
resulting modalities of popular affirmation appeared to mark a
turning point in the practice of early Caribbean Marxist socialist
democracy.30 That was the last time that the mechanics of popular
affirmation were used, and only as a supplement to a more
conventional use of voting.
Yet mass acclamation played a decisive role in the early stages
of post-revolutionary Cuba,31 and it has never been rejected as
inimical to the core ideology of the Cuban Leninism. Popular
acclamation at large gatherings of the people was a first effort to
find a way to produce democratic practice that avoided what was
increasingly seen as the ideologically corrupt system of popular
voting. It served as the first iteration of a process that sought to do
two things. The first was to distinguish the forms of democratic
engagement in Leninist states from that of Western liberal
democracies. The idea was that conventional voting was itself
ideologically contaminated with bourgeois principles of class
exploitation and that an alternative mode of democratic expression
was needed. The second was to embed principles of class
struggle—and of the primacy of the worker-revolutionary axis—
into the expression of democratic engagement.32 The development
Popular affirmation or acclamation is not unknown in liberal democratic
systems. For a discussion in the context of plebiscites, see, e.g., LAWRENCE T. FARLEY,
PLEBISCITES AND SOVEREIGNTY: THE CRISIS OF POLITICAL ILLEGITIMACY (Routledge,
2019). They have been criticized for their tenuous relationship with the legitimacy
and protections offered by democratic government. See, e.g., REFERENDUM
DEMOCRACY: CITIZENS, ELITES AND DELIBERATION IN REFERENDUM CAMPAIGNS
(Matthew Mendelsohn, Andrew Parkin eds. 2001). Plebiscites in other non-liberal
democratic states have also parallel challenges. See John Londregan & Andrea
Vindigni,
Authoritarian
Plebiscites,
paper
(2008),
https://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.625.7491&rep=rep1
&type=pdf.
30 It should be emphasized at this early point that the theory and principles
underlying Marxist Leninist acts of mass affirmation are built on quite distinct
principles from those of liberal democratic plebiscites or other forms of mass
referendum. Indeed, much of the efforts of the Cuban revolutionary government
was centered on distinguishing its mass affirmations from the practices of liberal
democratic states. See discussion infra at text and notes.
31 THE FIRST AND SECOND DECLARATIONS OF HAVANA: MANIFESTATIONS OF
REVOLUTIONARY STRUGGLE IN THE AMERICAS ADOPTED BY THE CUBAN PEOPLE (MaryAlice Waters, ed, 1962).
32 See, e.g., Building a (Very) New Road to Socialism? Cuba in the 21st Century, NODAL
NOTICIAS DE AMERICA LATINA Y EL CARIBE (Dec.
4,
2017),
29
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of these mechanisms, of Cuban Socialist Consultative Democracy
1.0, is the object of this section.

B. The Asamblea General Nacional del Pueblo de Cuba and
the Origins of the Socialist Plebiscite 1960-1962
The initial approach of the revolutionary government33 to
resolving the problem of the democratic participation of the
“collective” in a system developed under the mandatory leadership
of a ruling “core” was to attempt an exercise in direct sovereign
democracy by constituting a General National Assembly of the
Cuban People (Asamblea General Nacional del Pueblo de Cuba).34
It was used in two instances between 1960 and 1962, and produced
two key ideological instruments that defined Cuba's external
relations and the internal structures for the expression of sovereign
authority. It appeared in vestigial form at the end of the 1st PCC
Congress as part of a larger effort to create the Party-State
governance architecture (as the sovereign act of delegating
authority to both Party and to its popular expression) no longer in
general mass assemblies but in the institutionalization of the mass
will in the National Assembly of Popular Power. Yet that transition
ought not to take away from the importance of the development of
core political principles around the idea of mass assemblies, the
suspicion of popular voting, and the conception of the membership
of the polity that, under the direction of the vanguard, was fit to
exercise mass political power.

https://www.nodal.am/2017/12/building-very-new-road-to-socialism-cuba-inthe-21st-century/.
33 It is useful to remember that the revolutionary government established after
January 1, 1959 was essentially a military government that then slowly
transformed itself into a military-civilian apparatus whose institutions were not
formalized until 1976. See, e.g., Irving Louis Horowitz, CUBAN COMMUNISM 482,
482-511 (Irving Louis Horowitz and Jaime Suchlicki eds., 10th ed. 2001).
34 Tariq Ali, CASTRO: THE DECLARATIONS OF HAVANA vii, xii (Tariq Ali, ed., Verso,
2018) (In later years Fidel Castro explained that the Havana Declarations: “said
that an armed struggle: should not be embarked on if there existed legal and
constitutional conditions for a peaceful civic struggle. That was our thesis in
relation to Latin America.”).
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First Asamblea General Nacional del Pueblo de Cuba—
2 September 1960.

The first instance of a practice (however crude) of popular
direct democratic action appeared at the end of a mass assembly on
2 September 1960 in Havana.35 It marked the rupture of relations
with the United States.36 The event is inscribed in the political
consciousness of the post-revolutionary government in a quite
specific way:
In a plaza filled with the populace all demonstrating their
unconditional support for the triumphant Revolution of
January 1, 1959, there raised a unified powerful voice,
then Prime Minister Fidel Castro Ruz made known the
First Declaration of Havana. That convincing response
from the Cuban Revolution to the Organization of
American States (OAS) was then approved unanimously.
The Cuban people decide to confront the declarations of
that organization that up to then responds to the interests
of the United States.37
This was no ordinary gathering of supporters. The mass event
was quite deliberately framed as a constitutive gathering with
sovereign effect as a General National Assembly of the Cuban
People "an unprecedented event in the annals of Latin America,
[which] was legitimately constituted as a source of democratic
power, September 2, 1960."38
Id. at 79.
Id. at xi.
37 Fidel Castro: “¡Cuba es el territorio libre de América!”, CUBADEBATE (Sept. 7, 2017),
http://www.cubadebate.cu/especiales/2017/09/02/fidel-castro-cuba-es-elterritorio-libre-de-america/#.XVR1E8oXafB (“En una plaza repleta de pueblo que
demostraba su apoyo incondicional a la Revolución triunfante del 1ero de enero
de 1959, se levantaba una voz potente, el entonces primer ministro Fidel Castro
Ruz da a conocer la Primera Declaración de La Habana. Una respuesta convincente
de la Revolución Cubana a la Organización de los Estados Americanos (OEA) es
aprobada por unanimidad. El pueblo cubano decide enfrentarse a las
declaraciones de esta organización que hasta su actualidad responde a los
intereses de los Estados Unidos.”).
38 Id. ("Asamblea General Nacional del Pueblo de Cuba, suceso inédito en los
anales de Latinoamérica, fue legítimamente constituida como fuente de derecho
democrático, 2 de septiembre de 1960.").
35
36
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Two fundamentally important premises were articulated
around the Havana Declaration of relevance to the issue of
democratic accountability in (for this case) an emerging Leninist
system. The first touched on the mechanisms of direct democracy
in a large modern state. It centered both on the theory of democratic
action at a mass event, as well as the mechanics for determining
under what conditions such sovereignty exercising events might be
understood to exist. This was the immediate problem facing the
revolutionary government as it sought to confront the need to act.
The second was a longer-term concern. This centered on the role
and mechanics of voting, of elections, within a revolutionary state
suspicious of voting as a technique for class-based domination.

ii.

The mechanics of direct democracy.

With respect to the mechanics of direct democracy, the premise
of a popular assembly was meant to look both backwards to
overcome Cuba's past and forwards to provide a model for other
Latin American (and eventually all developing) states. It was, in its
own way, self-consciously universal in its pretensions—at least
with respect to the conditions and realities of Latin America.
Our small homeland today represents interests that go
beyond our borders. The destiny of our little homeland is
to be the beacon that enlightens the millions and millions
of men and women just like us, who in America today
suffer the same as we suffered yesterday! This glorious
destiny has touched us and we will be a light that will
never be extinguished, a light that will become brighter
each day and whose reflections will reach farther and
farther on the lands of sister America!39

Fidel Castro Ruz, Commander in Chief of Cuba, Speech Delivered at the People’s
Assembly
(Sept.
2,
1960),
http://www.cuba.cu/gobierno/discursos/1960/esp/f020960e.html) (“Nuestra
patria pequeña representa hoy intereses que se salen de nuestras fronteras. ¡A
nuestra patria pequeña le ha tocado el destino de ser el faro que ilumine a los
millones y millones de hombres y mujeres igual que nosotros, que en la América
sufren hoy lo mismo que nosotros sufríamos ayer! ¡Nos ha tocado ese destino
glorioso y nosotros seremos una luz que no se apagará nunca, una luz que será

39
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It looked backwards by interposing a popular assembly against the
tradition of what Fidel Castro called the “assembly of sergeants”
(with reference to the long history of control by the then recently
overthrown Batista dictatorship).40 It was meant to interpose the
performance of democratic and sovereign prerogatives through a
public assembly of people acting on instinct—and also guided with
respect to the details of its action by and through the leadership of
the revolutionary (not yet Marxist Leninist) government. That
government, of course, acquired legitimacy through force of
arms41—it was important to cement that initial armed legitimacy by
an expression of assent by a reunion of a group of people large and
potent enough to have rejected and undone that government (at
great cost but possible as later experiences in Egypt and Ukraine
would make clearer).42
It would have been logical that in any meeting of foreign
ministers Cuba would not be condemned; It would have
been logical that in any meeting of foreign ministers the
United States ought to have been condemned for its
aggressions against a small country. The absurdity was
that the small country would be condemned by the foreign
ministers, precisely to serve the designs of the powerful
aggressor country. And that is what we are going to
discuss today in this national general assembly of the
people of Cuba.
First, why is this a general assembly of the people? What
cada día más brillante y cuyos reflejos llegarán cada día más lejos sobre las tierras
de la América hermana!”).
40 See generally Louis A. Perez, Army Politics, Diplomacy and the Collapse of the Cuban
Officer Corps: the ‘Sergeants’ Revolt' of 1933, 6 J. OF LATIN AM. STU 59 (1974).
41 See, e.g., ARNOLD POMERANS, K. S KAROL, GUERRILLAS IN POWER: THE COURSE OF
THE CUBAN REVOLUTION (Hill & Wang, 1st ed., 1970).
42 See LINCOLN A. MITCHELL, THE COLOR REVOLUTIONS (University of Pennsylvania
Press, 2012) (on the color revolution in the Ukraine in this context). See REX BRYNEN,
PETE W. MOORE, BASSEL F. SALLOUKH & MARIE-JOELLE ZAHAR, BEYOND THE ARAB
SPRING: AUTHORITARIANISM & DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE ARAB WORLD (Lynn
Reinner Pub., 2012); Lisa Anderson, Demystifying the Arab Spring: Parsing the
Differences Between Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya, 90 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 2, 2-7 (2011) (on
the Arab Spring in Egypt in this context).
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does this mean about a general assembly of the people? It
means, in the first place, that the people are sovereign, that
is to say that sovereignty is rooted in the people and that
all powers emerge from it. (Applause). The people of
Cuba are sovereign. No one could argue that the majority
of the people are represented here; No one could argue
that the people are represented here. In the annals of the
history of our country such a crowd never met; In the
annals of the history of our country, such an act was never
seen; in the annals of the history of America such a
multitude never met; In the annals of the history of
America a similar act was never seen. (Applause).

We Cubans can speak to America today; We Cubans can
speak to the world today. A small group of political
"sergeants" has not gathered here; here a handful of
mercenaries have not gathered; Here the populace has
gathered today! (Applause.) Those who want to know
what a united populace, come and see this! Those who
want to understand a democratic people, come and see
this! Those who want to see what a people ruling their
own destinies, come and see this!; those who want to
know what a democracy is, come and see this! 43

Castro Ruz, supra note 39 (“Era lógico que en cualquier reunión de cancilleres
no se fuese a condenar a Cuba; era lógico que en cualquier reunión de cancilleres
se condenase a Estados Unidos por sus agresiones a un país pequeño. Lo absurdo
era que el país pequeño fuese a ser condenado por los cancilleres, precisamente
para servir los designios del poderoso país agresor. Y eso es lo que vamos a
discutir hoy en esta asamblea general nacional del pueblo de Cuba.
En primer lugar, ¿por qué es esta una asamblea general del pueblo? ¿Qué
quiere decir esto de una asamblea general del pueblo? Quiere decir, en primer
lugar, que el pueblo es soberano, es decir que la soberanía radica en el pueblo y
que de él dimanan todos los poderes (APLAUSOS). El pueblo de Cuba es
soberano. Nadie podría discutir que aquí está representada la mayoría del pueblo;
nadie podría discutir que aquí está representado el pueblo. En los anales de la
historia de nuestra patria jamás se reunió semejante multitud; en los anales de la
historia de nuestra patria jamás se vio un acto semejante; en los anales de la historia
de América jamás se reunió semejante multitud; en los anales de la historia de
América jamás se vio un acto semejante (APLAUSOS).
Los cubanos podemos hoy hablarle a América; los cubanos podemos hoy
hablarle al mundo. Aquí no se ha reunido un grupito de “sargentos” políticos; aquí
no se ha reunido un puñadito de mercenarios; ¡aquí se ha reunido hoy el pueblo!

43
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And thus, the general national assembly of the people was
juxtaposed against the assemblies of contemporary democracy and
dictatorship—the assemblies of states beholden to a great power,
and the assemblies of national actors beholden to a "primus."
Against these, which were characterized as mimicking the forms of
democracy,44 Fidel Castro offered the performance of the masses
themselves, gathered together in the largest open space in
Havana—as the incarnation of the genius of the people and vested
by that reason with the full sovereign authority of the political
community self-constituted as the Cuban Republic.45
To be clear, the object of that characterization was neither to
defend it nor to reject it, but rather to hold it up as an important
moment in the development of Caribbean Marxist notions of what
in China might have been eventually be come to be understood as
the mass line.46 But the mass line in Cuba was from the start
practiced in an entirely different way. Given the nature of the
revolutionary government—revolution first and political selfconception after—it makes sense to understand that the
revolutionary government would first draw on Western principles
of pure democracy, likely sieved through glimmerings of Rousseau
(as they might have understood them).
The notion of popular assembly was then generalized as a basic
theory of democratic governance of states in their external relations.
To that extent, the ideology began to conflate the notions of popular
assent with that of the nature of representation in states. The result
was curious in the sense that it suggested that representation on the
model of liberal democratic states was no representation at all; and
that the revolutionary leadership (e.g., vanguard leadership model
emerging in the post-1959 governance apparatus of Cuba)
(APLAUSOS.) Los que quieran saber lo que es un pueblo reunido, ¡que vengan y
vean esto!; los que quieran saber qué es un pueblo democrático, ¡que vengan y
vean esto!; los que quieran ver lo que es un pueblo rigiendo sus propios destinos,
¡que vengan y vean esto!; los que quieran saber qué es una democracia, ¡que
vengan y vean esto!”).
44 For a discussion of Fidel Castro on liberal democracy, see, e.g., Juan Carlos Medel,
Cuban Democracy in the Speeches of Fidel Castro, 1959–1976, 11, 2 INT’L. J. OF CUBAN
STUD. 332 (2019).
45 Castro Ruz, supra note 39.
46 See Tiezzi, supra note 14; Young, supra note 15; Backer, supra note 16.
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provided a more authentic model of representative and democratic
action.
It is a principle, it is an elementary principle of public law,
that no state official can commit his country in acts of
international law, if that act does not have the approval of
the people. A representative of any country does not go to
an international meeting in its own right. Nobody has the
right on their own to compromise the international
conduct of a country, and those who go without
representing the countries, to compromise the behavior of
the countries, do not commit such behavior. Any act that
is done over the sovereign will of the people, is a null act,
it lacks validity. Therefore, the validity of the declaration
of Costa Rica does not depend on the will of the foreign
ministers, it depends on the will of the people, and one
cannot come to the Cuban people with the story that this
declaration has any validity merely because they claim to
represent the peoples, No! We have to prove to ourselves
that this is the feeling of the people. (Applause) And we
ask the government of Venezuela, the government of
Peru, the government of Chile, the government of
Argentina, the government of Brazil, the government of
Ecuador, the government of Costa Rica; that is, we ask,
respectfully, the governments of America to summon
their peoples in a general assembly and submit to them
the Declaration of Costa Rica. (Applause).47

Castro Ruz, supra note 39 (“Es un principio, es un principio elemental de derecho
público, que ningún puede comprometer a su país en actos de derecho
internacional, si ese acto no cuenta con la aprobación del pueblo. Un representante
de cualquier país no va a una reunión internacional por su propio derecho. Nadie
tiene derecho por su propia cuenta a comprometer la conducta internacional de
un país, y los que van sin representar a los países, a comprometer la conducta de
los países, no comprometen tal conducta. Todo acto que se haga por encima de la
voluntad soberana de los pueblos, es un acto nulo, carece de validez. Por tanto, la
validez de la declaración de Costa Rica depende no de los cancilleres, depende de
los pueblos, y al pueblo de Cuba no le pueden venir con el cuento de que esa
declaración tenga validez, porque ellos dicen representar a los pueblos, ¡no!, a
nosotros hay que probarnos que ese es el sentimiento de los pueblos (APLAUSOS).
Y nosotros le pedimos al gobierno de Venezuela, al gobierno de Perú, al gobierno
de Chile, al gobierno de Argentina, al gobierno de Brasil, al gobierno de Ecuador,
al gobierno de Costa Rica; es decir, les pedimos, respetuosamente, a los gobiernos

47
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That theory was then meant to serve not just the Cuban context,
but rather, the model for all (small) republics, or at least those who
were seeking liberation from the constraints of an international
system that, from the perspective of the Cuban revolutionary
government, was bound in dependency to a master state. "And he
who fails to gather together the people, he is not a democrat; he
who does not consult the people, he is not a democrat; to be a
democrat one has to consult the people. That only happens in
Cuba!48 Notice here the intimate connection between mass
assemblies and the guidance of the vanguard, already well
developed, though not using the traditional discursive tropes of
Soviet Leninism . . . yet.

iv. The theory of voting in revolutionary governments.
But inherent as well in the notion of popular expression in mass
assemblies, were the notions of authentic democracy and of the role
of voting and thus of authentic representation). Fidel Castro was at
pains to describe this to the Assembly itself in September 1960:
And this [assembly] is a representation, because here
there is no "pucherazo" [vote management by the
principal parties and connected with “caciquismo”], no
fraud, no vote buying, no political sergeant, no
machinery, no bottle, and there is nothing; This is pure!
(Applause.) This is a democracy free of impurities, free of
impurities, it is a truly "pasteurized" democracy
(LAUGHTER AND APPLAUSE). And do not tell us that
the other is more democracy than this; that the democracy
of the political sergeant, of the "pucherazo", of the bottle,
of politicking, of bribery, of the purchase of consciences,
of coercion, of the political machinery, is purer than this.
Can there be anything purer than a meeting of the whole
people? (EXCLAMATIONS OF: "No!") Did someone
de América que convoquen a sus pueblos en asamblea general y les sometan la
Declaración de Costa Rica (APLAUSOS).”).
48 Id. (“Y el que no reúna al pueblo, el que no reúna al pueblo, ¡ese no es demócrata!;
el que no consulte al pueblo, ¡ese no es demócrata! ¡Para ser demócrata hay que
consultar al pueblo! (EXCLAMACIONES DE: “¡Eso solo se da en Cuba!”)").
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bring the town by force? (EXCLAMATIONS FROM:
"No!") Did someone pay the town to come?
(SHOUTING: "No!") The one who came here and is
passing the work that you are going through, because we
know that in a crowded crowd there are many people who
faint, and there are many people . . . ].49
Again, the juxtaposition between what the Cuban government
painted as a liberal democracy with elaborate forms but no real
substance against the purity of a direct expression of democratic
action through assemblies of the masses at which all of the
perceived deficiencies of the liberal order were absent. But of
course, this would be possible only because the element of
spontaneous assembly (something truly revolutionary in the sense
of the Orange Revolution in Ukraine or the Arab Spring in Egypt)50
was avoided. Spontaneous assemblies were revolutionary in the
sense that their aim was to replace the ruling order. Castro's notion
that a popular assembly physically assembled could be democratic
within a revolutionary governance order extend only so far. It is
legitimacy extended no farther than the ability of the political
vanguard to manage them. In the case of Cuba, that vanguard
acquired the legitimate mantle of leadership and the authority to
guide by virtue of a military triumph.
The text of the Havana Declaration itself elaborated what was
to be the initial conceptual position of what would emerge as
Caribbean Marxism. Its sixth paragraph expressed “the conviction
that democracy cannot consist only in the exercise of an electoral
vote, which is almost always fictitious and is managed by large
landowners and professional politicians, but in the right of citizens
to decide, as now does this General Assembly of the People of
Cuba, their own destinies. Democracy, moreover, will only exist in
America when the people are really free to choose, when the

Id. (“Y el que no reúna al pueblo, el que no reúna al pueblo, ¡ese no es demócrata!;
el que no consulte al pueblo, ¡ese no es demócrata! ¡Para ser demócrata hay que
consultar al pueblo! (EXCLAMACIONES DE: “¡Eso solo se da en Cuba!”)").
50 See supra text accompanying note 42.
49
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humble are not reduced-by hunger, social inequality, illiteracy and
legal systems-to the most ominous impotence.”51
The position reflects what has crystallized into the well-known
position, first of the Soviet bloc, and then of developing states with
respect to the realization of human dignity (expressed in the
language of rights) and its relationship to the fundamental notion
of democratic expression through voting and similar mechanisms
developed at the core of theories of Western liberal democracies.
That approach is premised on the notion that liberal democracies
are inherently corrupt because of the effects of economic
subordination on the free will of voters. As a consequence,
economic rights are central and paramount to the attainment of
political rights. Political rights cannot be bootstrapped into
existence through its mechanics, especially the mechanics of
elections. As a consequence, centering principles of democracy
around voting in the absence of economic rights which liberates
individuals from the effective (direct or indirect) control of
hierarchy (defined in any number of ways) amounts to a subterfuge
and the substitution of political theater for democratic politics.
And, of course, what follows is the need for a focus on economic
rights, the centrality of a leading force installed for that purpose,
and the central objective of government to guide its people toward
liberation. Most importantly, it reconstitutes the people (worthy of
exercising sovereignty) to those already committed to the project of
economic liberation (understood in the Marxist sense for the most
part), and excluding all other individuals as unsuitable for the
exercise of popular sovereignty under the leadership of a "right
acting" vanguard.

Castro Ruz, supra note 39 (“la convicción cubana de que la democracia no puede
consistir sólo en el ejercicio de un voto electoral, que casi siempre es ficticio y está
manejado por latifundistas y políticos profesionales, sino en el derecho de los
ciudadanos a decidir, como ahora lo hace esta Asamblea General del Pueblo de
Cuba, sus propios destinos. La democracia, además, sólo existirá en América
cuando los pueblos sean realmente libres para escoger, cuando los humildes no
estén reducidos — por el hambre, la desigualdad social, el analfabetismo y los
sistemas jurídicos—, a la más ominosa impotencia.”).

51
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v. Second Asamblea General Nacional del Pueblo de
Cuba—4 February 1962.
The Second National General Assembly was organized on 4
February 1962, in response to yet another international rebuff of the
Cuban revolutionary government by other Latin American states.
Specifically, the trigger was the action taken by the OAS at its
January 1962 meeting, at which the organization voted for
additional sanctions against Cuba, the day after U.S. President
Kennedy signed Executive Order No. 3447, more firmly
establishing what then became known as the Cuban Embargo.52
"Today, this General Assembly is meeting for the second time, as a
sovereign organ of the will of the Cuban people; and meets to give
full response to the maneuver, the scheme, the plot of our enemies
in Punta del Este.”53
The event and its context, then, assumes a fundamental place
within the development of the principles and orientations of the
Cuban state both internally and in its relationship with its
neighbors. Those principles, and the context in which they arose,
also resonated with the Cuban leadership and their allies in the
Caribbean, in the midst of the 7th PCC Congress and the
development of the Reconceptualization Of The Political And Economic
Model along with the constitutional reform that necessarily
followed. In 2017, an official Cuban organ noted:

PATRICK J. HANEY & WAT VANDERBUSH, THE CUBAN EMBARGO: THE DOMESTIC
POLITICS OF AN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 18 (U. Pittsburgh Press, 2005) (discussing
the origins of the Cuban Embargo). But see Ted Henkin & Archibald Ritter,
Overcoming Cuba's Internal Embargo, CURRENT HISTORY, Feb 2015, at 73 (discussing
what has been referenced as Cuba’s internal embargo).
53 Fidel Castro Ruz, Commander in Chief of Cuba, Speech Delivered at the Second
National
Assembly
(Feb.
4,
1962)
(transcript
available
at:
http://www.cuba.cu/gobierno/discursos/1962/esp/f040262e.html) (“Se reúne
por segunda vez, con carácter de órgano soberano de la voluntad del pueblo
cubano, esta Asamblea General en el día de hoy; y se reúne para dar cabal
respuesta a la maniobra, a la conjura, al complot de nuestros enemigos en Punta
del Este."); see generally William Tell, Segunda Declaración de La Habana: Por su Única,
Verdadera e Irrenunciable Independencia, CUBADEBATE (Feb. 4, 2017),
http://www.cubadebate.cu/especiales/2017/02/04/segunda-declaracion-de-lahabana-por-su-unica-verdadera-e-irrenunciableindependencia/#.XVd2U8oXafA.
52
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More than a million Cubans filled the Plaza de la
Revolución [formerly the Plaza de la República]
answering the call for assembly made by the
Revolutionary Government for the purpose of
constituting the Second National General Assembly of the
People, which approved the Second Declaration of
Havana, which reaffirmed our dignity as a free,
independent and sovereign nation, while proclaiming the
projection and Latin Americanist vocation of the Cuban
Revolution.54
That was certainly echoed by the friendly elements of the then
government of Venezuela through its press organs: “With the
passage of time the [2nd Declaration of Havana] has become a true
affirmation of principles advancing. Over the years, the Declaration
became a true affirmation of principles, in favor of the projection
and Latin American character of the Cuban Revolution with a deep
respect for the socialist and internationalist character of the Cuban
political process.55
One of the most interesting elements of the Second General
National Assembly was the way in which it affirmed the notion of
people grounded in class and political solidarity in a way that
effectively permitted the reconstitution of "the people" without
respect to nationality. “With us there are many Latin Americans
who visit our country or participated in the Peoples Conference in
Havana (applause), but they should not be just spectators. We
propose to the National General Assembly of the People that Latin
Americans not be spectators, but also have the right to vote along
with the people of Cuba, the Declaration of Havana (PROLONGED
APPLAUSE AND EXCLAMATIONS OF: "Fidel, Fidel!").56 This
Tell, supra note 53 (“más de un millón de cubanos colmaron la Plaza de la
Revolución al llamado que hiciera el Gobierno Revolucionario para constituir la
Segunda Asamblea General Nacional del Pueblo, la cual aprobó la Segunda
Declaración de La Habana, que reafirmó nuestra dignidad como nación libre,
independiente y soberana, al tiempo que proclamaba la proyección y vocación
latinoamericanista de la Revolución Cubana.”).
55 Cuba celebra los 55 años de la II declaración de La Habana, TELESUR (Feb. 4, 2017),
https://www.telesurtv.net/news/Cubacelebra-los-55-anos-de-la-II-declaracionde-La-Habana-20170202-0032.html.
56 Castro Ruz, Commander in Chief of Cuba, Speech delivered at the Second
National Assembly (Feb. 4, 1962).
54
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provided the kernel of the union of mass national solidarity with
regional integration that many decades later found expression in
the Socialist Regionalism of the Cuba-Venezuela lead Bolivarian
Alliance. 57
The focus was not anarchic. Rather it furthered the emerging
principles of Latin American solidarity at the heart of Caribbean
Marxism.58 That solidarity posited a common supra-sovereign
alignment of Latin American states in opposition to the United
States and its purported domination of the hemisphere: 59 “No Latin
American people are weak, because they form part of a family of
200 million brothers who share the same miseries, harbor the same
sentiments, and have the same enemy, who all dream of a better
destiny, and which count on the solidarity of all honest men and
women worldwide."60
Taken together, the two General National Assemblies produced
an ideological urtext from which the PCC would find it difficult to
reject. The revolutionary government had acquired popular
legitimacy through victory in an armed conflict joined only by a
minority of Cubans. Such a legitimacy, however, had to be
sanctioned by a meeting large enough to allow those in attendance
to either approve or the revolutionary government, or else to undo
it. By obtaining affirmations of approval at the two Havana rallies,
the armed nucleus of the Cuban Revolution posited itself not only
as the political representative of the people, but as its acting core.
The Cuban Revolution had rejected notions of political
representation by candidates from competing parties chosen
through the casting of ballots. Such a rejection was based on the
vulnerability of electoral processes to exogenous and endogenous
interference. Electoral fraud, intervention by agents of foreign
governments and by economic lobbies, the adverse impacts of
socio-economic malaise on popular awareness of and engagement
See generally, Larry Catá Backer & Augusto Molina, Cuba and the Construction of
Alternative Global Trade Systems: ALBA and Free Trade in the Americas, 31 U. PA. J.
INT’L L. 679 (2010).
58 This was a theme well developed in the speeches of Fidel Castro. See, e.g., Fidel
Castro, De Seattle al 11 de Septiembre 101-129 (Txalaparta ed., 2002).
59 See Backer & Molina, supra note 57.
60 Id.
57
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in governance were seen as factors impeding the formation and
manifestation of a truly free will. To these perceived ills, the
revolutionary government found the antidote of collective
decision-making through acclamation.
The resulting demos—as opposed to the ochlos 61—was
defined not along the lines of class divisions, in a Marxist sense. In
a more classically Socialist fashion, political citizenship belonged to
those willing to eliminate all the factors leading to economic and
social subordination, achieve individual and collective selfdetermination, and who supported the endeavors of the more
active nucleus of the Cuban Revolution. Such a conception of the
demos was transnational, as political citizenship was earned not by
virtue of legal citizenship, but by the mere belonging to any of the
social groups bearing the negative externalities of regional
economic and social development policies, and by a rejection of
such an individual and collective condition. Political citizenship cut
across the lines of national borders, ideologies and structures of
governance, including persons born in Latin America, but also –
ideally – U.S. citizens, and persons living in other continents. If
participation to mass rallies granted political citizenship, then such
participation could not be entirely spontaneous. Exclusion of those
unwilling to participate in the Revolution was proven by
nonattendance to the rallies convened in the 1960s.62 More
See Peter J. Fliess, Political Disorder and Constitutional Form: Thucydides’ Critique of
Contemporary Politics, 21 U. Chicago J. Pol. 592 (1959); cf. Jasmin Hasanović,
Ochlocracy the Practices of Civil Society: A Threat for Democracy?, 2 STUDIA JURIDICA
ET POLITICA JAURINENSIS, 56 (2015) (discussing demos versus ochlos (the people
versus the mob).
62 Cf. Mao Zedong’s principle of democratic dictatorship:
Who are the "people"? At the present stage in China, they are
the working class, the peasantry, the petty bourgeoisie and the
national bourgeoisie. You are dictatorial." My dear sirs, what
you say is correct. That is just what we are. All the experiences
of the Chinese people, accumulated in the course of successive
decades, tell us to carry out a people's democratic dictatorship.
This means that the reactionaries must be deprived of the right
to voice their opinions; only the people have that right. Under
the leadership of the working class and the Communist Party,
these classes unite to create their own state and elect their own
government so as to enforce their dictatorship over the
henchmen of imperialism—the landlord class and bureaucratic
capitalist class, as well as the reactionary clique of the
61
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important was avoiding that manifestations of direct democracy be
polluted by the intervention of the same interests and forces who
could manipulate conventional electoral processes.
This is not the only reason why rallies had to be organized by
the active nucleus of the Revolution. During the Havana
plebiscitarian meetings Fidel Castro, who was then the Prime
Minister of Cuba, explained the reasons that had led to the drafting
of the First and Second Havana Declaration. In liberal-democratic
systems, national governments are accountable to parliaments, and
subject to their oversight. Notions of Socialist democracy in Cuba
were, and still are, fundamentally different. The liberal-democratic
concept of accountability is replaced by responsibility of the active
part of the Revolution towards every one of its components. The
revolutionary core bears the duty of guiding the people towards
the path of development chosen by them, acting on its behalf. It is
within the concept of responsibility that mass rallies acquire their
importance, because they provide the venue to express agreement
towards concrete methods of revolutionary guidance, or tits
contrary.
Finally, from its very onset Cuba’s Socialist democracy had
a transnational element. The mass plebiscites held on the then Civic
Square were meant to provide a model to be followed by other
Latin-American states, and more generally speaking, by the
economically and socially disempowered. The two sessions of the
National General Assembly had not only produced an ideological
urtext where popular affirmation played a fundamental role in
legitimating the authority of the revolutionary core. They had also
developed a first nucleus of principles of “socialist democracy” in
Kuomintang, which represents these classes, and their
accomplices. The people's government will suppress such
persons. It will only permit them to behave themselves
properly. It will not allow them to speak or act wildly. Should
they do so, they will be instantly curbed and punished. The
democratic system is to be carried out within the ranks of the
people, giving them freedom of speech, assembly and
association. The right to vote is given only to the people, not to
the reactionaries. These two things, democracy for the people
and dictatorship for the reactionaries, when combined,
constitute the people's democratic dictatorship.
Mao Zedong, The People’s Democratic Dictatorship (June 30, 1949).
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a Caribbean context, which anti-establishment movements in
neighboring states would soon embrace.63 Even though
plebiscitarian meetings no longer took place after 1962, the
plebiscite remained as a latent possibility in Cuba’s governance
system.
More importantly, however, the participation urtext, grounded
in the essential role of popular affirmation as the fundamental
device for legitimating the authority of the vanguard, opened the
possibility that this mass popular assembly might one day not approve.64
But at the same time, it pressed the principle of vanguard guidance
to constrain the discretion of mass assemblies. And it substantially
boxed in the breadth of popular action by limiting its exercise to
those who were already committed to the revolutionary enterprise,
starting with the objects of class struggle: workers, peasants, and
aligned intellectuals. “From then the socialist character of the
Revolution had been declared, there had been a rupture of relations
with the United States, the invasion of the Bay of Pigs and the
creation of the single [vanguard] party, first called Revolutionary
Integrated Organizations (ORI) and then United Party of the Cuban
Socialist Revolution (PURSC)."65
Eduardo Rey Tristán, La izquierda revolucionaria uruguaya, 1955-1973, in 435
PUBLICACIONES DE LA ESCUELA DE ESTUDIOS HISPANOAMERICANOS 288 (Consejo
Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas, 2005).
64 This was, of course, always the danger of physical presence in mass rallies.
Theoretically, though, such loss of control would have been unthinkable, and
practically, the vanguard would have ensured that the “right people” all properly
instructed and managed and minded, would be in attendance. For a discussion of
the way in which these mass rallies were organized in Cuba before 1976, see, e.g.,
Gerald Popiel, Pachanga Si!: Two Months in Castro’s Cuba, 41(2) THE DALHOUSIE
REVIEW 139, 151 (1961) (“At the rallies I sensed that I was witnessing a seance in
which a strange intimacy was being enacted. These rallies are like tribal
conclaves”). But this tension between theory and the mechanics of its execution
produced the sort of contradiction that can be used to discredit this form of
democratic expression. Some of those critiques also spill over into the referendum
and plebiscite forms of liberal democracy, especially in the context of the “new”
populism. See, e.g., Paul Lewis et al., Revealed: the rise and rise of populist rhetoric,
THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 6, 2019) https://www.theguardian.com/world/nginteractive/2019/mar/06/revealed-the-rise-and-rise-of-populist-rhetoric;
cf.,
MARCO REVELLI, THE NEW POPULISM: DEMOCRACY STARES INTO THE ABYSS (David
Broder, trans., Verso Books, 2019).
65 In the original: “Para entonces había sido declarado el carácter socialista de la
Revolución, se había producido la ruptura de relaciones con Estados Unidos, la
invasión de Bahía de Cochinos y la creación del partido único, primero llamado
63
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But as well, out of the second General Popular Assembly and
the 2nd Havana Declaration emerged the kernels of what by 1975
would provide the core structures of Caribbean Leninism, one that
marches decisively away from the forms of popular direct
democracy while attempting to maintain its ideological legitimacy.
The device of the popular mass assembly did not wither on the
vine, but was instead the object of experimentation to tame it, to
domesticate it, to make it more useful as a mechanism for the
legitimization of the leadership and guidance of the vanguard
party with respect to operationalization of its political line through
state organs. That experimentation reached its most refined point
in the construction of Asamblea Nacionales prototypes in the
provinces after the end of the 1960s. But before then it manifested
itself in the revolutionary government's constant efforts to "bottle
the genie" of popular affirmation in more pragmatically aligned
instruments:
The accelerated transition from a brief experience of
direct democracy to a first communist-type
institutionalization on the island was accompanied by the
creation of a set of mass organizations-neighborhood
committees, peasant, youth and women's associations,
trade unions . . . , that governmentalized Cuban civil
society. This [governmentalized] institutionalization was
still precarious during the 60s and was constantly
destabilized by the twists of the changing economic
policy of the revolutionary government in that decade.”66

Organizaciones Revolucionarias Integradas (ORI) y luego Partido Unido de la
Revolución Socialista de Cuba (PURSC).” Rafael Rojas, La Soledad Constitucional
Del Socialismo Cubano, FIU Steven J. Green School of International & Public Affairs
Commissioned Reports, Papers and Presentations, at 44 (Aug. 10, 2011), available
at
https://lacc.fiu.edu/research/publications/constitutional_isolation_of_cuban_s
ocialism.pdf.
66 In the original: “El tránsito acelerado de una breve experiencia de democracia
directa a una primera institucionalización de tipo comunista, en la isla, se dio
acompañado de la creación de un conjunto de organizaciones de masas –comités
vecinales, asociaciones campesinas, juveniles y femeninas, sindicatos…-, que
vertebró estatalmente la sociedad civil cubana. Dicha institucionalidad fue todavía
precaria durante los años 60 y se vio constantemente emplazada por los giros de
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The resulting search for a means of producing representative
government along Caribbean Leninist lines would prove to be a
longer-term project.
Connecting the device of General National Assemblies to the
popular constitutive actions around the 1st PCC Congress in 1975
and the approval of the 1976 constitution requires the development
of devices that were meant to solve the ultimate problem that this
mechanism ultimately presented a maturing revolutionary
government—a problem that has confronted all government based
on popular sovereignty—that of efficiency. Like other similarly
constituted states, the Cuban revolutionary government would
eventually choose the path of representative mass democracy. But
it would be one that required two distinct levels to reconcile its
operations to the core postulates of Leninist government. The fist
layer would have to consist of the classical Leninist theory of
vanguard party power; with the vanguard party understood to
incarnate and represent the political will of the nation. At the same
time, the masses would have to be reconstituted in representative
form so that they might be assembled efficiently and managed
effectively. To that end one moves from the assembly of the masses
in 1962 to the construction of the national assembly of popular
power, a subject which we take up next.

vi. Caveats.
The analysis must be understood within the peculiar context of
the Cuban national situation. Four are especially worth keeping in
mind as one moves from pragmatics efforts to a theory of
affirmation within Cuban Leninism. First, it is possible to reduce
the two Havana Declarations to Agit-Prop.67 That is, the most
important enduring element of the Havana Declarations were their
theatrics. More specifically, the Havana Declarations could be
la cambiante política económica del gobierno revolucionario en aquella década.”
Rojas, supra note 65; cf. LUIS M. BUCH, GOBIERNO REVOLUCIONARIO CUBANO. GÉNESIS
Y PRIMEROS PASOS (La Habana, Editorial de Ciencias Sociales, 2001).
67 Agit-Prop, of course, has been a mainstay of the radical left for over a century,
even though the technique has no specific ideology as such. See, e.g., Kevin Brown,
Agitprop in Soviet Russia, 14, CONSTRUCTING THE PAST 5, 5-8 (2013) (“Agitprop
theatre had one explicit purpose: to reach the working class directly.”).
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reduced to two quite specific and temporally constrained
objectives. On the one hand, they might be understood as the
production of propaganda to manage masses internally, one that
was effectively abandoned after 1962 except for its historically
useful propaganda effect.68 At the same time the Havana
Declarations might be understood as a means toward the projection
of images of democracy that are meant to target influential Western
intellectuals and the popular press. Castro had a love affair with
Western intellectuals—and that affair required a certain amount of
courtship.69 The Havana Declarations fit right into the cultivation
of the semi-savage post-colonial peoples that so titillated the
intellectual predilections of the upper levels of the intelligentsia
and journalist classes.
Second, the Havana Declaration might not point so much to the
development of a new approach to Leninist collectivism through a
mechanics of vanguard-led affirmation as much as it pointed to a
reactionary element in the pre-Marxist Cuban revolutionary
government. Indeed, the choice of a public spectacle in the capital
more resembled the now anachronistic blood ritual affirmations
around the guillotine of the French Terror then it did the
revolutionary Leninist mechanics of managing socialist democratic
impulses (even in the 1960s).70 As an experiment, then, it looked
backwards rather than forward and could not have survived the
“We are the people of the second Havana Declaration, which we did not copy
from any document, but which was the pure expression of the profoundly
revolutionary and highly internationalist spirit of our people.” Fidel Castro Ruz,
Statement on Cuba Chinese Relations (Feb. 6, 1966), available at
http://lanic.utexas.edu/project/castro/db/1966/19660206.html.
69 For a discussion of the cultivation of Western intellectuals by the PCC, see, e.g.,
KEPA ARTARAZ, CUBA AND WESTERN INTELLECTUALS SINCE 1959 (Palgrave
MacMillan, 2009); Carlos Alberto Montaner, The Cuban revolution and its acolytes,
31 SOCIETY, no. 5, 1994, at 73.
70 See generally Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (Alan
Sheridan, trans., Vintage Books 2d ed. 1995) (1977). More interesting might be the
inspiration drawn either from the great spectacles in the Soviet Union (and China
in the 1950s), to the show trials of the 1930s, or their fascist counterparts. See, e.g.,
Chang-Tai Hung, Mao's Parades: State Spectacles in China in the 1950s, 190 CHINA Q.
411 (2007); Valentina G. Lebedeva, Totalitarian and Mass Elements in Soviet Culture
of the 1930s, 42 RUSSIAN STUDIES IN HISTORY, no. 2, 2003, at 66; James von Geldern,
Putting the masses in mass culture: Bolshevik Festivals, 1918-1920, 31 JOURNAL OF
POPULAR CULTURE, 123, 123-144 (1998); Jeffrey T. Schnapp, 18 BL: Fascist Mass
Spectacle, 43 REPRESENTATIONS 89, 89 (1993).
68
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transposition of Leninism into the Revolutionary government over
the next decade. Moreover, the device is anachronistic in the sense
that it gives the Capital disproportionate weight. Lastly, and
perhaps more importantly, the device carried with it a danger of
conflation with bourgeoisie mechanisms where the Revolutionary
government was looking for something distinctive. To that end the
affirmation rather than the voting element of the technique would
require another half century of development.
Third was the problem of the democratic character of the
affirmation exercise represented in the Havana Declarations. These
can be understood in several dimensions. First, who are these
people who showed up in the square in Havana? Certainly, they
were citizens of the capital and surrounding places; also likely were
a group of people transported to the capital from all over Cuba by
the revolutionary government.71 But was this enough to make the
affirmation either special or democratically authentic? That is a
harder question with no satisfactory answer. Second, as a tool of
government the exercise of the Havana Declarations posed a
logistical nightmare. Even all of the people packed into the square
in central Havana would have to serve as a representative of rather
than as a manifestation of all of the people. But there is little to
guide the authenticity of that representative element. And no one
suggested the lunacy of gathering the Cuban people even in as
large a square as that set aside for this exercise in Havana. Lastly,
the role of the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution and
other mass organizations might both expose the “guiding role” of
the revolutionary government and also weaken their claim to a
spontaneity and congregation of people.72
Lastly, this form of affirmation foreclosed any engagement.
Affirmation negates the possibility of any form of discursive space.
The nature of affirmation is yes-no-silence. With the focus on
affirmation, even “no” becomes difficult as the disciplinary power
of the mob to silence dissent becomes a powerful element of the
See e.g. JORGE I. DOMINGUEZ, CUBA: ORDER AND REVOLUTION (Harvard University
Press, 1978); see e.g. RICHARD FAGEN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF POLITICAL CULTURE
IN CUBA (Stanford University Press, 1969).
72 See e.g. Richard R. Fagen, Mass Mobilization in Cuba: The Symbolism of Struggle,
20(2) J. OF INT’L AFFAIRS 254, 269-71 1966; see generally LUIS SALAS, SOCIAL CONTROL
AND DEVIANCE IN CUBA (Praeger Publishers, 1979).
71
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exercise. The result is a flattening of discussion. There can be no
effort within this affirmation exercise to theorize, much less
consider, Vanguard obligations respecting these “affirmations.”
But discussion was not what the revolutionary government was
after. Affirmation, then is nicely detached from and serves a
different purpose from engagement either with or through the
vanguard party.
In the end, though, what emerges clearly here is a technique
with possibilities. It has the possibility of cloaking revolutionary
actions of a vanguard with a democratic cover. It can connect the
vanguard directly to the people. It offers a means of popular
participation that could be distinguished from bourgeoisie (or
capitalist system) political elections. And it could reaffirm the
guiding leadership role of what would emerge as the Communist
Party of Cuba in the years leading to the First PCC Congress in the
mid-1970s, a subject to which we turn next.

C. From the Asamblea General Nacional del Pueblo de Cuba
to the Asamblea Nacional del Poder Popular; Situating
Popular Assent Within an Institutional Cage, 1962-1976.
For the Cuban state, the second Havana Declaration marked the
last time the revolutionary government used the mechanism of
assembly this way. Between the beginning of 1962 and the mass
activities around the development of the ideological documents
approved in the 1st PCC Congress in 1975 there were many
assemblies of the masses in the Plaza de la Revolución.73 But those
assemblies were rallies and not constitutive in any sense. But of
course, it was for the vanguard to determine the character of the
assembly—to an outsider it would have been hard to distinguish a
large mass rally from the constitutive assemblies held in 1960 and
1962. The key to both was not the assembly itself but the invocation
of its sovereign character, not by the masses themselves, but by its
vanguard, those with the authority to assemble the people in this
way.
See FIDEL CASTRO RUZ, FIDEL CASTRO READER, 483-98 (David Deutschamn &
Deborah Shnookal, eds., Ocean press, 2008); William M. LeoGrande, The Theory
and Practice of Socialist Democracy in Cuba: Mechanisms of Elite Accountability, 12
STUDIES IN COMPARATIVE COMMUNISM 39, 48 (1979).
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Viewed in this way, even at this stage, the Cuban revolutionary
government was feeling its way toward Leninist governance
principles combined with Marxist political principles.74 That
journey was grounded in class struggle in which the only people
who mattered were the proletarian and the revolutionary worker
cadres (the Cuban "militantes" nodding toward the military focus
of the initial success). What was emerging was a consistency in
mechanics: it was clear that a sort of corporatist "active-passive"
principle had been embraced. That is, the principle of popular mass
action could not be self-invoked, it acquired its constitutive
character only as a result of the call to assembly by the vanguard.
And that call could only be understood as effective when exercised
only by the people, which were understood, in turn to include only
those leading forces of society in solidarity with the principles of
the revolution and the leadership of the revolutionary government.
The circle is complete.

i.

Constraining popular power within a cage of
representative institutionalization.

It is against this ideological backdrop that the revolutionary
government slowly confronted the issue of its institutionalization.
Like all revolutionary governments, the Cuban governing
apparatus was brought face to face with the contradictions of its
principles as a revolutionary party against the realities of running
a state.75 And like the Soviet Union, the Cuban revolutionary
government made a number of choices that brought into tension its
earlier core ideologies and the allurements of an ideology, not of a
nomenklatura76 (for that had already progressed prodigiously
between 1962 and 1976) but of the vessel for popular affirmation of
vanguard policy to then be sent back to the vanguards cadres

See e.g. SHELDON B. LISS, FIDEL!: CASTRO’S POLITICAL AND SOCIAL THOUGHT, 47-54
(Westview Press, 1994).
75 Nicholas Boline, Fidel Castro's Grand Strategy in the Cuban Revolution: 1959-1968,
PAPERS & PUBLICATIONS: INTERDISCIPLINARY J. OF UNDERGRADUATE RESEARCH, 2015;
see also Leon Trotsky, The Russian Revolution: The Overthrow of Tzarism and the
Triumph of the Soviets, 477 (F.W. Dupree, ed., Max Eastman, trans., Doubleday,
1932).
76 See, e.g., MICHAEL VOSLENSKY, NOMENKLATURA: THE SOVIET RULING CLASS (1984).
74
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placed strategically within the administrative apparatus of the
state.77
For the revolutionary government that required a progression
from revolutionary government to socialist state, with respect to
which Fidel Castro sought to cast in as good a light as possible. “In
this transcendental and historical act, of which we are all living
witnesses, the provisional period of the Revolutionary Government
ceases and our definitive institutional forms are adopted by our
socialist State. The National Assembly is constituted as the supreme
organ of the State and assumes the functions assigned to it by the
Constitution. It was a duty and it is at the same time a great triumph
of our generation to reach this goal."78
The official history suggests an organic progress from a
revolutionary state in which all authority had to be concentrated in
the hands of a single vanguard to a position of stability that at last
permitted the revolutionary vanguard to seek to institutionalize its
governance through representative organs under its leadership.79
The necessities of dismantling the structures and operations of U.S.
(primarily) colonialism (as they characterized the relationship) and
the need to develop new structures created a context in which the
revolutionary government took for itself all of the powers of state.80
It “decreed revolutionary laws, expropriated the exploiters
property, and developed basic social mutations, successfully
carried out the political struggle against external and internal
aggression. Supported overwhelmingly by the people, the
See, e.g., DANIEL N. NELSON, STEPHEN WHITE (EDS.), COMMUNIST LEGISLATURES IN
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (MacMillan 1982).
78 Fidel Castro Ruz, Commander in Chief of Cuba, Speech Delivered at the
National Assembly of Popular Power (Dec. 2, 1976) (available at:
http://www.cuba.cu/gobierno/discursos/1976/esp/f021276e.html) ("En este
acto trascendental e histórico, del cual todos somos testigos vivientes, cesa el
período de provisionalidad del Gobierno Revolucionario y adopta nuestro Estado
socialista formas institucionales definitivas. La Asamblea Nacional se constituye
en órgano supremo del Estado y asume las funciones que le asigna la Constitución.
Era un deber y es a la vez un gran triunfo de nuestra generación arribar a esta
meta.").
79 See, e.g., Aviva Chomsky, A History of the Cuban Revolution, WILEY 40-51 (2nd ed.
2015).
80 On the mechanics of government before 1976 in Cuba, see, e.g., William M.
LeoGrande, The Politics of Revolutionary Development: Civil-Military Relations in
Cuba, 1959–1976, 1 J. OF STRATEGIC STUD. 260, 260-294 (1978).
77
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revolutionary government promoted in this period vast and deep
political, economic, social and cultural transformations in Cuban
life."81 But, of course, it was not clear that it was either a duty or a
triumph; or if it was, whether it was to a large extent a fulfilled of
the ideological promises of the earliest period of revolutionary
governance. More importantly, it was not entirely true—as the
revolutionary government used that period to develop and apply
principles of mass popular approval as the fundamental modality
for ratification of their actions.
Yet that process of democratic ratification was actually
undertaken only twice; the rhetoric of ratification remained far
more potent than its application. And that augured another
conundrum for the government: it could not abandon its core
ideological notion of popular ratification at mass events; such
undertakings, however, had been reserved for extraordinarily
events; that left unanswered questions about the scope of any
obligation to seek popular (mass) acclamation. If the scope of
mandatory popular affirmation was broad, then a mechanism
would have to be developed for the institutionalized invocation of
the popular will (its affirmation power). However, to the extent that
this would require devolving that popular power to an institution,
it would raise the issue of popular representation in such a body.
But to approach that question was also to confront the companion
ideological constraint made explicit in the two Havana
Declarations—specifically the ideological line that traditional
voting mechanisms were corrupted by the ideology of liberal
democracies and would tend to lead to systemic corruption in the
sense that it would create incentives towards class-based
dominance.
Moreover, even if one could solve that problem, the
fundamental problem of the relationship of this mechanism for
popular assent to the leadership responsibilities of the PCC would
In the original: “El “dictó las leyes revolucionarias, expropió a los explotadores,
desarrolló básicas mutaciones sociales, llevó a cabo con éxito la lucha política
frente a las agresiones externas e internas. Apoyado masivamente por el pueblo,
el gobierno revolucionario impulsó en este período vastas y hondas
transformaciones políticas, económicas, sociales y culturales en la vida cubana."
Asamblea
Nacional
Der
Poder
(2018),
https://www.ecured.cu/Asamblea_Nacional_del_Poder_Popular.
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have to be theorized and also operationalized within the
institutional structures created. That relationship, in turn, might be
based on principles of active rather than passive power already
inherent in the relationship between the revolutionary government
and the Asambleas General Nacional. And yet, it might also require
something more than a simple affirmation of work done elsewhere.
It was necessary, then, also to consider the extent to which such an
institutionalized voice of popular affirmation might also be avenue
for review and interaction (here with an institutionalized voice of
the people) of the legislative and policy guidance received from the
PCC.
By the early 1970s, a determination was made that there was a
need to streamline the process of popular approval of fundamental
acts not otherwise reserved to the administrative machinery.82 The
constitution of mass assemblies like the Asambleas General
Nacional del Pueblo de Cuba of the early 1960s was ideologically
ideal but practically impossible for the business of acquiring a
constant and uniform and predictable approval of leadership
guidance by the PCC. At the same time, the idea of engagement
was thought useful—the idea that popular deep engagement in the
formulation of the actions to be affirmed doubled the instance of
popular investment in the work of the state and cemented the
theoretical requirement of popular involvement in the operation of
the state. To that end, the PCC developed a new model for reform
that was to have a substantial impact on the way in which it
understood and practiced what was to become Caribbean Marxist
Socialist democracy.

ii.

A Transition from a Revolutionary to a MarxistLeninist State Institution Requires a Constitution to

See, e.g., Fidel Castro Ruz, Formation of the Cuban Communist Party and Che’s
Farewell Letter (Oct. 3, 1965), in FIDEL CASTRO READER 275-292 (David Deutschamnn
and Deborah Shnookal, eds., 2008); see also, Lourdes Casal, On Popular Power: The
Organization of the Cuban State During the Period of Transition, 2 LATIN AMERICAN
PERSP. 78, 78-88 (1975).
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Memorialize the Transition: Theorizing Popular
Participation in Constitutional Reform in Cuba.
Cuba was essentially without a formal constitution (though not
without a form of basic law) from just after the establishment of the
post-Batista government in 1959, its transformation into a MarxistLeninist form of government in the early 1960s, and its
development during the first 15 years of its existence.83 The
adoption of the first post-revolutionary constitution marked the
formal establishment of an autonomous (of sorts) PCC under the
strong direction of its core—the PCC's First Secretary (Fidel Castro)
and the PCC Central Committee—and the celebration of its first
PCC Congress.84
The first PCC Congress adopted what in retrospect have
remained the core organizing documents of the political and
economic systems that remains the operational base of its society.85
These resolutions framing the core premises of the political and
economic order were then to be transposed into a state
constitution.86 That state constitution was then itself to be the object
through which the masses would be informed of the political
principles around which the state was organized, and also to
provide the masses with an opportunity to engage with those
principles.
The First Congress of the Communist Party of Cuba
considers that the text perfected by the Central
Preparatory Commission with the contributions of public
and popular discussion of the Draft Constitution, based on
the principles of Marxism-Leninism, serves the firm
decision of our Party and our [proletariat] to endow our
country with a Socialist Constitution that, because it
See, e.g., Max Azicri, The Institutionalization of the Cuban State: A Political
Perspective, 22 J. OF INTER-AM. STUD. & WORLD AFF. 315, 315-344 (1980).
84 See, e.g., William M. LeoGrande, Party Development in Revolutionary Cuba, 21 J. OF
INTER-AM. STUD. & WORLD AFF. 457, 457-480 (1979).
85 See, e.g., Michael B. Wise, Cuban Constitutionalism: Will There Be Changes, 51 DUQ.
L. REV. 467, 467 (2013); Michael Bognan, Thrity Years of Cuban Revolutionary Law, 15
REV. SOCIALIST L. 319 (1989).
86 See, e.g., Edward Gonzales, Castro and Cuba's New Orthodoxy, 25 PROBS.
COMMUNISM 1 (1976); L.B. Klein, The Socialist Constitution of Cuba (1976), 17 COLUM.
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 451 (1978).
83
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corresponds to the realities and needs of the construction
of socialism, is an inviolable norm for the actions of all,
both the organs of the State, its leaders, officials and
employees, as of each citizen in particular; be a sure
foundation of the rise and consolidation of socialist
legality. . . . The First Congress of the Communist Party
of Cuba, in consequence, gives its approval to the
improved text of the Draft Constitution and recommends
that it be officially published as the Constitution Project
of the Republic and submitted by referendum to the
universal, free and secret vote of citizens, together with
the Constitutional Transit Bill; that the referendum be
organized so that all citizens with the right to vote have
the opportunity to vote in it, for which polling places must
be established with reference not only to domicile, but
also to where the voters are located . . . so that the
Constitution can be proclaimed solemnly on February 24,
the eighty-first anniversary of the start of the
revolutionary war for national independence organized by
José Martí, whose desire that the First Law of the
Republic is the cult of Cubans to the full dignity of man,
presides over our Constitution, as a norm of our socialist
society and principle always present in the whole
development of our Revolution.87
But this engagement was not to be undertaken without
boundaries on discourse. Rather popular participation was meant
to serve as a further means through which the vanguard
revolutionary party could continue its project of socializing the
masses to the revolutionary order. Fidel Castro made that quite
clear in his address to the Congress:
We are sure that whatever may be missing so that the
Congress has the highest quality, so that the event has the
greatest significance, will be carried out. Because this is
precisely the First Congress, it is faced with countless
issues of the greatest interest. And, in reality, great and
important decisions, which will greatly influence the
I Congresso Del Pcc: Tesis Y Resoluciones Sobra La Constitucíon Y Ley De Tránsito
Constitucional, GRANMA (Dec. 26, 1975), at 5.

87

76

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI INT’L & COMP. L. REV.

Vol. 27:1

future life of the country, must be taken by that Congress.
Currently, we are in the midst of discussing the
Constitution of the Republic with all the people. The
Constitution of the Republic took us almost 40 hours of
analysis and discussion in the Preparatory Commission.
Now all the people are discussing it. Then we will have to
analyze it again, taking into account the opinions and the
judgments that have been expressed. And we see with
what interest the people have taken the discussion of the
Constitution. * * * When the revolutionary processes are
institutionalized and consolidated through truly adequate
institutions - as was the case with the Bolshevik
Revolution, which is now more than 50 years old, which
is progressing uninterruptedly, and we know that it will
continue to advance - we see what great stability it gives
these people, What great stability do these nations and
these human collectivities have when they organize
themselves
well,
when
they
become
well
institutionalized, when they have the right organisms to
move forward?88

Fidel Castro Ruz, Commander in Chief of Cuba, Speech Delivered to the Party
of Leaders of Mass Organizations (May 29, 1975), (available at:
http://www.granma.cu/file/pdf/PCC/1congreso/DISCURSO-DE-FIDEL-ENEL-ACTO-EN-QUE-LE-FUERAN-ENTREGADOS-LOS-COMPROMISOS-DELPUEBLO-EN-SALUDO-AL-PRIMER-CONGRESO-DEL-PARTIDO.pdf)
(“Estamos seguros de que lo que falta para que el Congreso tenga la mayor
calidad, que el evento tenga la mayor significación, será cumplido. Por ser este
precisamente el Primer Congreso, comprende un sinnúmero de asuntos del mayor
interés. Y, en realidad, grandes e importantes decisiones, que influirán
enormemente en la vida futura del país, se han de tomar en ese Congreso. Por lo
pronto, ya estamos discutiendo con todo el pueblo la Constitución de la República.
La Constitución de la República nos llevó casi 40 horas de análisis y de discusión
en la Comisión Preparatoria. Ahora la está discutiendo todo el pueblo. Después
tendremos de nuevo que analizarla, tomando en cuenta las opiniones y los
criterios que se han vertido. Y vemos con qué interés el pueblo ha tomado la
discusión de la Constitución. * * * Cuando los procesos revolucionarios se
institucionalizan y se consolidan através de instituciones realmente adecuadas —
como ocurrió con la Revolución Bolchevique, que tiene ya más de 50 años, que
avanza ininterrumpidamente, y sabemos que seguirá avanzando—, vemos qué
gran estabilidad le da a esos pueblos, qué gran estabilidad tienen esas naciones y
esas colectividades humanas cuando se organizan bien, cuando se
institucionalizan bien, cuando tienen los organismos adecuados para marchar
adelante.”).
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And that that popular engagement was to be undertaken and
narrowed through the lens of revolutionary representation. It was
clear that the idea ideologically was that the masses would be
represented best by those among them with the greatest credentials
as PCC adherents and most attached to the PCC's line developed
especially for the purpose of conceiving and articulating a
constitution.
Our people know who is part of the Party, know that these
militantes [cadres] were selected in the work centers with
the active participation of the masses; [our people] know
that the best workers work in the Party, knows that the
best citizens are in the Party, and knows that for the
Congress the Communists chose among the best
Communists to draw the line of the Party. (Applause) And
that is why our people feel represented in the Party. But
also, the most important principles were discussed with
all the people. The people participated in the elaboration
of these principles and in the elaboration of the politics of
the future years. And that is why our people know that the
principles and agreements of the Congress are their
principles and are their agreements! (APPLAUSE). If
there, in the "Karl Marx", the Congress of the Party meets,
here in the Plaza of the Revolution the People's Congress
meets to express its support for the agreements of the
Congress (applause). But if we vote there, we must vote
here too (applause). If there we discuss and approve all
theses, here, in representation of all the people, we must
also vote, and ask our people if they support or do not
support the agreements of the Congress (applause and
shouts of: "Yes!").89

“Nuestro pueblo sabe quiénes integran el Partido, sabe que esos militantes
fueron seleccionados en los centros de trabajo con la activa participación de las
masas; sabe que en el Partido militan los mejores obreros, sabe que en el Partido
militan los mejores ciudadanos, y sabe que para el Congreso los comunistas
eligieron entre los mejores comunistas para trazar la línea del Partido
(APLAUSOS). Y por eso, nuestro pueblo se siente representado en el Partido. Pero
además, las tesis más importantes fueron discutidas con todo el pueblo. El pueblo
participó en la elaboración de esas tesis y en la elaboración de la política de los
años futuros. ¡Y por eso sabe que las tesis y los acuerdos del Congreso son sus tesis
y son sus acuerdos! (APLAUSOS). Si allí en el "Carlos Marx" se reunió el Congreso
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The conflations so densely intermeshed in the quoted language
above becomes the operative model of popular participation, and
also established a baseline that itself will prove a challenge to a
Leninist organizational structure increasingly desiring to
streamline its governance organs—including organs for popular
affirmation. Yet the keys to overcoming that contradiction are
already present here—the identity between the PCC and the
leading forces of the nation, the identity between Party cadres and
the most suitable representatives of the masses, the dual role of the
PCC as both the vanguard party whose leadership is central to
government and as the true representation (incarnation) of the
people and the popular will essential for the legitimization of the
actions undertaken by the vanguard, and the importance of
popular consultation of the work product of the Party and its
organs by the people whose interventions are then considered in
finalizing actions by Party and State. But at the same time there is
at least one last look back to earlier forms of mass expression—of
the authority of gatherings of the masses at the instance of and
under the guidance of the PCC, whose affirmation of their
representatives’ action "performs" sovereign approval. These are
the patterns that ought to be keep in mind as we move from the
development of these reflexes in the practice of Cuban Leninism,
and the process through which, after 2011, the economic and
political model of the state and party are reconceptualized, an
economic plan for the nation is developed, a program of reform and
opening up as the basic line of the PCC is developed, and the
national constitution is reformed.90

del Partido, aquí en la Plaza dela Revolución se reúne el Congreso del pueblo para
expresar su apoyo a los acuerdos del Congreso (APLAUSOS). Pero si allí votamos,
aquí debemos votar también (APLAUSOS). Si allí discutimos y aprobamos todas
las tesis, aquí, en representación de todo el pueblo, debemos también votar, y
preguntarle a nuestro pueblo si apoya o no apoya los acuerdos del Congreso
(APLAUSOS Y EXCLAMACIONES DE: "¡Sí!"). Id.
90 See generally, JORGE DOMINGUEZ, OMAR EVERLENY PÉREZ VILLANUEVA, EDS., THE
CUBAN ECONOMY IN A NEW ERA: AN AGENDA FOR CHANGE TOWARD DURABLE
DEVELOPMENT (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University David Rockefeller Center for
Latin American Studies and Harvard University Press, 2017) (discussing how the
economic model has not gone uncontested).
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Caveats.

Again, a number of caveats are in order at this point. The first
is that the transposition of the (convenient) Soviet model also
managed to transpose its weaknesses. These included the cult of
personality Stalinism that ultimately contributed to the collapse of
Soviet versions of Leninism,91 and the construction of a rules-bound
nomenklatura that would effectively seek to smother democratic
engagement and the role of the masses and mass organizations in
their collective exercise of discretionary political power.92 Second,
the period from 1976 and the conclusion of the 1st PCC Congress
increasingly evidence the growing gap between theory (such as it
might be developed) and the realities of Cuban government,
usually characterized as reinventions or reactions to stress.93 The
resulting evisceration of Leninist theory reduced its utility to post
facto rationalization to cover the pragmatic decision making that
passed for PCC leadership from 1976.94 Third, evisceration was also
noticeable in the way in which the institutionalization of “popular
power” within the Asamblea Nacional produced a greater distance
between the masses, and mass organizations, and the leadership of
the PCC. Even by the standards of classical Leninist theory, the
resulting Stalinization of the role of masses made affirmation not
See, e.g., Graeme Gill, The Soviet Leader Cult: Reflections on the Structure of
Leadership in the Soviet Union, 10 BRITISH J. OF POL. SCIENCE 167, 167-186 (1980). See
Note, supra note 9. See also A.V. Pyzhikov, A. V., The cult of personality during the
Khrushchev Thaw. 50(3) RUSSIA STUD. IN HISTORY 11, 11–27 (2012). See, e.g., D. LEESE,
MAO CULT: RHETORIC AND RITUAL IN CHINA’S CULTURAL REVOLUTION (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2011) (discussing the Chinese version of personality
cults).
92 See generally, John Lowenhardt, Nomenklatura and the Soviet Constitution, 10 REV.
SOCIALIST L. 35 (1984); Bohdan Harasymiw, Nomenklatura: The Soviet Communist
Party's Leadership Recruitment System, 2 CANADIAN J. OF POL. SCIENCE, 493–512
(1969); John P. Burns, China's Nomenklatura System, 36 PROBS. COMMUNISM 36 (1987)
(discussing the Chinese nomenklatura system).
93 See generally, MAX AZICRI, CUBA TODAY AND TOMORROW: REINVENTING SOCIALISM
246-249 (2004); PHILIP BRENNER, MARGUERITE ROSE JIMÉNEZ, JOHN M. KIRK, WILLIAM
M. LEOGRANDE (EDS.), A CONTEMPORARY CUBA READER: REINVENTING THE
REVOLUTION 25-104 (Rwoman and Littlefield, 2008); ARIANA HERNANDEZ-REGUANT
(ED.), CUBA IN THE SPECIAL PERIOD: CULTURE AND IDEOLOGY IN THE 1990S (Palgrave
MacMillan, 2009).
94 See, e.g., Paul C. Sondrol, Totalitarian and Authoritarian Dictators: A Comparison of
Fidel Castro and Alfredo Stroessner, 23(3) J. OF LATIN AM. STUDIES 599-620 (1991); Bert
Hoffmann, Transitions from Charismatic Rule: Theories of Leadership Change and
Cuba's Post-Fidel Succession, GIGA Working Paper No. 56 (Aug. 1, 2007).
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merely vestigial after 1962, but also irrelevant—until it was
resurrected after 2011.95 Third, even with the construction of the
Asamblea nacional mechanism, the problem of mass representation
remained unresolved in theory and practice. Jorge Dominguez has
suggested the ways in which claims of voting itself have proven
either that it retains a fidelity to bourgeoisie roots (voting for people
rather than affirming qualified representative choices of the
vanguard)or that the affirmation/engagement role of the Asamblea
remains under developed.96 The result was either systemic
corruption or/and functional delegitimization.

D. A Pure Theory of Elections within a Caribbean Leninist
State.
Cuba's first post 1959 revolution constitutional plebiscite was
held as part of the organization of the Cuban Communist Party and
the institutionalization of its structures. It marked one of the
significant products of the PCC's 1st Congress.97 It was embedded
within a broader project of elaborating the core principles of what
would become Cuba's Caribbean Marxism, with respect to what
would emerge as the first conceptualization of Cuba's economic
and political model. This formalization of the PCC's "Basic Line"98
and the conceptual expression of the principles of political and
economic organization were expressed in the many documents and
resolution produced under the guidance of the Central Committee

For a discussion of the use of mass organizations in Cuba after 1959, see, e.g.,
Benigno E. Aguirre, Social Control in Cuba, 44(2) LATIN AM. POL. AND SOC. 67 (2008).
96 Jorge I. Dominguez, Chair of Harvard Academy for International and Area
Studies, Address to the Annual Conference of the Association for the Study of the
Cuban Economy: The Democratic Claims of Communist Regime Leaders: Cuba’s
Council of State in a Comparative Context (July 25-27, 2019).
97 Congreso PCC, Llamamiento al 1er Congreso PCC, Centro de Información para la
Prensa (1975).
98 On the role and shaping of a communist party “basic line” see, e.g., John Wilson
Lewis, The Leadership Doctrine of the Chinese Communist Party: The Lesson of the
People's Commune, 3 ASIAN SURVEY 457-464 (1963); Larry Catá Backer, supra note
28.
95
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of the PCC and its First Secretary, and approved at the 1st PCC
Congress.99
To those ends, of course, the 1st PCC Congress and its work
product constituted the first major coordinated effort to solidify the
ideological foundations of the Cuban political-economic model and
on that foundation to build the institutional structures necessary for
its application to the nation.100 That foundation looked to
institutionalize the role of the Communist Party in its overarching
role as a vanguard with the primary objective of ensuring stability
and conformity with its ideological line in the operation of the state.
“When the revolutionary processes are institutionalized and are
consolidated through institutions that are really adequate—as
occurred with the Bolshevik Revolution, now more than 50 years
old, that advances in an uninterrupted way, and that we know will
continue advancing—one sees the sort of profound stability these
institutions provide to those peoples, one sees the sort of great
stability that these nations and human collectives have, when they
are well organized, when they are well institutionalized, and when
they have the appropriate organs to move forward.”101
99Among

the documents that remain available on the PCC website are those that
touch on the issues of formal PCC organization, and the expectations of PCC
cadres, on the organs of popular power, on the establishment of mechanisms for a
centrally planned economy, on the role of the Party-State in science, arts and
culture, on the guiding role of the PCC and its work of socializing the masses, and
on the relationship between the Party-State and religious establishments. See e.g.,
Sobre la Plataforma Programática.; Sobre los Estatutos del Partido.; Sobre la Vida Interna
del Partido.; Sobre la política de formación, selección, ubicación, promoción y superación
de los cuadros.; Sobre las directivas para el desarrollo económico y social en el quinquenio
1976-1980.; Sobre la Constitución y Ley de tránsito constitucional. Sobre los Organos del
Poder Popular.; Sobre la División Político-administrativa.; Sobre las directivas para el
desarrollo económico y social en el quinquenio 1976-1980.; Sobre el Cronograma de
aplicación de la división político-administrativa, los órganos del Poder Popular y el Sistema
de Dirección de la economía.; Sobre Política Internacional.; Sobre los Estudios del
marxismo-leninismo en nuestro país.; Sobre los Medios de difusión masiva.; Sobre Política
educacional.; Sobre Política Científica Nacional.; Sobre la Cultura artística y literaria.;
Sobre la Cuestión agraria y las relaciones con el campesinado.; Sobre la Política en relación
con la religión, la iglesia y los creyentes.; Sobre el pleno ejercicio de la igualdad de la mujer.;
Sobre la formación de la niñez y la juventud.; Sobre las apelaciones.; Sobre el XI Festival
Mundial de la Juventud y los Estudiantes.; Resolución Especial.
100 See id.
101 Fidel Castro Ruz, Commander in Chief of Cuba, Speech Delivered to the Party
of Leaders of Mass Organizations (May 29, 1975), (available at:
http://www.granma.cu/file/pdf/PCC/1congreso/DISCURSO-DE-FIDEL-EN-
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Thus, that solidification has had staying power; despite many
challenges and crisis, the vanguard party has remained loyal to
the core premises of what in retrospect were the foundations of
Cuba's Caribbean Marxism.102 These continue to inform the
operation and conceptual universe of its leaders to this day.103 That
institutionalization included among its core elements a state
constitution, the reorganization of territorial divisions, the
establishment of a national assembly, and the reorganization of the
administrative organs of the state. “In these last few months, the
Revolution has been expending a considerable effort to implement
the accords adopted by the [First PCC] Congress: the Constitution,
the establishment of the [National Assembly of] Popular Power, the
new Political-Administrative division, the restructuring of the
central organs of the state, the progressive embedding of a system
of management for the economy, and countless more tasks of
partisan and state order.”104
Caribbean Marxism, however, was never intended as mere
theory. Rather, its object was to inform the political and economic
project of the PCC to be implemented through administrate
institutions designed and operated to that end. This, as a first task,
those structuring and conceptual premises, and particularly the
EL-ACTO-EN-QUE-LE-FUERAN-ENTREGADOS-LOS-COMPROMISOS-DELPUEBLO-EN-SALUDO-AL-PRIMER-CONGRESO-DEL-PARTIDO.pdf)
(“Cuando los procesos revolucionarios se institucionalizan y se consolidan através
de instituciones realmente adecuadas—como ocurrió con la Revolución
Bolchevique, que tiene ya más de 50 años, que avanza ininterrumpidamente, y
sabemos que seguirá avanzando—vemos qué gran estabilidad le da a esos
pueblos, qué gran estabilidad tienen esas naciones y esas colectividades humanas
cuando se organizan bien, cuando se institucionalizan bien, cuando tienen los
organismos adecuados para marchar adelante.”).
102 BACKER, supra note 3 at 27-35.
103 Jorge I. Dominguez, CUBAN COMMUNISM 533-540 (Irving Louis Horowitz &
Jaime Suchlicki, eds., 10th ed. 2001); see generally BACKER, supra note 3.
104 Fidel Castro Ruz, Commander in Chief of Cuba, Speech Delivered to the City
of
Havana
(Sept.
28,
1976),
(available
at:
http://www.cuba.cu/gobierno/discursos/1976/esp/f280976e.html)
(“La
Revolución viene realizando en estos últimos meses un considerable esfuerzo en
la aplicación de los acuerdos del Congreso: la Constitución, el establecimiento de
los Poderes Populares, la nueva División Político-Administrativa, la
reestructuración de los organismos centrales del Estado, la implantación
progresiva de un sistema de dirección de la economía, e incontables tareas más de
orden partidario y estatal.“).
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economic and political model embraced in the 1st PCC Congress
required translation into an institutionalized political apparatus.
That, in turn, required the institutionalization of a mass
organization for the expression of popular power. That produced
the organization of the National Assembly of Popular Power,
whose work began on 2 December 1976.105
In this transcendental and historical act, of which we are
all living witnesses, the provisional period of the
Revolutionary Government ceases and our definitive
institutional forms are adopted by our socialist State. The
National Assembly is constituted as the supreme organ of
the State and assumes the functions assigned to it by the
Constitution. It was a duty and it is at the same time a
great triumph of our generation to reach this goal. * * *
These representatives of the people receive no
remuneration for their status as deputies. Nor do they
exercise office without the control of their fellow citizens.
Their representation is revocable at any time by the same
that elected them. None will be above the law, nor the rest
of his countrymen. Their positions do not entail privileges
but duties and responsibilities. In our system, too, the
government and the administration of justice depend
directly on the National Assembly. There is division of
functions, but there is no division of powers. Power is one,
that of the working people, exercised through the National
Assembly and the State agencies that depend on it.106

I Legislatura 1976–1981, PARLAMENTO CUBANO (Apr. 19, 2016),
http://www.parlamentocubano.gob.cu/index.php/i-legislatura-1976-1981/ (last
visited Aug. 6, 2019).
106 Fidel Castro Ruz, Commander in Chief of Cuba, Speech Delivered at the
National Assembly of Popular Power (Dec. 2, 1976), (available at:
http://www.cuba.cu/gobierno/discursos/1976/esp/f021276e.html) (“En este
acto trascendental e histórico, del cual todos somos testigos vivientes, cesa el
período de provisionalidad del Gobierno Revolucionario y adopta nuestro Estado
socialista formas institucionales definitivas. La Asamblea Nacional se constituye
en órgano supremo del Estado y asume las funciones que le asigna la Constitución.
Era un deber y es a la vez un gran triunfo de nuestra generación arribar a esta
meta. * * * Estos representantes del pueblo no reciben remuneración alguna por su
condición de diputados. Tampoco ejercen el cargo sin el control de sus
conciudadanos. Su representación es revocable en cualquier instante por los
mismos que los eligieron. Ninguno estará por encima de la ley, ni del resto de sus
105
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A blueprint was also required for the administrative structure
through which the economic and political model could be
implemented through state organs. These administrative organs
would institutionalize administrative authority through which the
PCC would operate—not as a vanguard, but as a state organ
asserting the administrative power of government both internally
and externally. These were to be confirmed by the new
revolutionary constitution.
These organs were not meant merely to implement Marxist
Leninist ideology, but to preserve it as well. Fidel Castro in 1976
was at some pains to point out the importance of the relation
between ideology, the state organs, and the integrity of the
vanguard Communist Party by contrasting Cuba and the Soviet
Union to China. China ceased to be a Leninist and Marxist state
when it chose to abandon its core ideology, when it started to
abandon class struggle and the privileging of workers, peasants
and their allies.

That the most absurd things can happen even in the bosom
of the socialist family and in countries that started that
glorious and revolutionary path, if the principles are
neglected, if the concepts are lost, if men become gods, if
internationalism is abandons, it's the recent history of
China. * * * All this can happen when a corrupted and
deified clique can take over the Party, destroy, humiliate
and crush the best militants and impose its will on the
entire nation, supported by the strength and prestige that
emanates from a profound social revolution. I have
always believed that the founders of a revolutionary
socialist process acquire before their fellow citizens such
authority and ancestry, such and such powerful means of
power that the unrestricted use of that authority, that
compatriotas. Sus cargos no entrañan privilegios sino deberes y
responsabilidades. También en nuestro sistema el gobierno y la administración de
justicia dependen directamente de la Asamblea Nacional. Hay división de
funciones, pero no hay división de poderes. El poder es uno, el del pueblo
trabajador, que se ejerce a través de la Asamblea Nacional y de los organismos del
Estado que de ella dependen.”).
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prestige and those means can lead to serious errors and
incredible abuses of power. I think for that reason and I
have always thought that whatever the individual merits
of any man, every manifestation of personality cult must
be radically avoided; that any man, no matter what
aptitudes can be attributed to him, will never be superior
to collective capacity, than collegiate leadership,
unrestricted respect for the practice of criticism and selfcriticism, socialist legality, democracy and partisan and
state discipline and the inviolability of the norms and the
basic ideas of Marxism-Leninism and socialism are the
only values on which a true revolutionary leadership can
be sustained.107
Thus, ideology provides the boundary between a revolutionary
democratic state under the direction of a vanguard party, and a
vanguard party that it has become a reactionary force. But that
ideology can only be protected by the masses themselves—that is,
the revolutionary masses to which popular authority could be
vested—in a state of class struggle that would include only
workers, students, peasants and their allies. They serve as the
critical authenticating and protective force that preserves the
Leninist and Marxist principles of the state even against its own
“De que las cosas más absurdas pueden ocurrir aún en el seno de la familia
socialista y en países que iniciaron ese glorioso y revolucionario camino, si los
principios se descuidan, si los conceptos se pierden, si los hombres se hacen dioses,
si el internacionalismo se abandona, es la historia reciente de China. * * * Todo eso
puede ocurrir cuando una camarilla corrompida y endiosada puede hacerse dueña
del Partido, destruir, humillar y aplastar a los mejores militantes e imponer su
voluntad a toda la nación, apoyada en la fuerza y el prestigio que emana de una
profunda revolución social. Siempre he creído que los fundadores de un proceso
revolucionario socialista adquieren ante sus conciudadanos tal autoridad y
ascendencia, tales y tan poderosos medios de poder, que el uso irrestricto de esa
autoridad, ese prestigio y esos medios puede llevar a graves errores e increíbles
abusos de poder. Pienso por ello y he pensado siempre, que cualesquiera que sean
los méritos individuales de cualquier hombre, toda manifestación de culto a la
personalidad debe ser radicalmente evitada; que cualquier hombre, no importa
qué aptitudes se le puedan atribuir, nunca será superior a la capacidad colectiva,
que la dirección colegiada, el respeto irrestricto a la práctica de la crítica y la
autocrítica, la legalidad socialista, la democracia y disciplina partidista y estatal y
la inviolabilidad de las normas y las ideas básicas del marxismo-leninismo y el
socialismo son los únicos valores sobre los cuales puede sostenerse una verdadera
dirección revolucionaria.” Id.
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organs. Consequently, the ideology, and the institutionalization of
state and Party organs was not enough to conform to the core
ideological requisite of mass solidarity. Though these organs of
popular power that implemented the conceptualization of the
Cuban economic and political model were developed under the
leadership of and with the guidance of the PCC, it was also thought
necessary to invoke a mechanism for the concrete expression of
popular participation and approval.
That institutionalized expression of mass solidarity was to be
undertaken in two ways. The first was through an exercise of popular
consultation. That in turn served the purposes of obtaining
feedback, but also as a mechanism for identifying popular
sentiment and to socialize the masses as to the appropriate way to
approach the political project undertaken through the leadership of
the PCC. “For now, we are already discussing the Constitution of
the Republic with all the people. The Constitution of the Republic
took us almost 40 hours of analysis and discussion in the
Preparatory Commission. Now the whole town is discussing it.
Then we will have to analyze it again, taking into account the
opinions and criteria that have been expressed. And we see with
what interest the people have taken the discussion of the
Constitution.”108 To that end, the state organized a comprehensive
series of formalized discussion session where popular opinion was
identified, gathered, and passed on in summary form.109 And, in
that respect the local mass organizations served a useful purpose to
both organize mass engagement, and to discipline it.110
Castro Ruz, supra note 101 ("Por lo pronto, ya estamos discutiendo con todo el
pueblo la Constitución de la República. La Constitución de la República nos llevó
casi 40 horas de análisis y de discusión en la Comisión Preparatoria. Ahora la está
discutiendo todo el pueblo. Después tendremos de nuevo que analizarla, tomando
en cuenta las opiniones y los criterios que se han vertido. Y vemos con qué interés
el pueblo ha tomado la discusión de la Constitución.").
109 1 JAN SUTER & DIETER NOHLEN, ELECTIONS IN THE AMERICAS 197 (Dieter Nohlen
ed., 2005).
110 Castro Ruz, supra note 104 (“Y, efectivamente, además de las tareas habituales,
los Comités de Defensa han desarrollado un gran esfuerzo en apoyo de todas las
actividades que se llevan a cabo en cumplimiento de los acuerdos del Primer
Congreso. Fue necesario un arduo trabajo para organizar el referéndum en que se
proclamó la Constitución Socialista de nuestro país; ha sido necesario también un
ingente esfuerzo en todas las tareas relacionadas con la nueva División PolíticoAdministrativa y la constitución de los Poderes Populares; todo el trabajo
relacionado con los carnés de identidad, los registros de electores y la organización
108
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The second form of institutionalized expression of mass solidarity was
to be undertaken by signs of mass approval of the final product
developed from consultation and the work undertaken under the
leadership of the PCC. This was to take two distinct but related
forms, each evidencing the unique re-characterization of the
devices in socialist terms. Indeed, at this initial phase of socialist
mass participation (still too early to call it theorized socialist
democracy), it was necessary to develop the character and nature
of popular (mass) participation. The first modality for the expression of
mass solidarity was through acclamation, and the expression of the
unity of the people with the Party at mass events guided by PCC
leadership. "But, in addition, this Congress has reflected the
extraordinary unity of our people and our Party, and it has been a
profoundly just and profoundly human Congress."111 This
acclamation device was to be manifested at mass events. The Cuban
state apparatus was careful to record this manifestation. Again, a
reminder of the critical portion of the address quoted at greater
length above: “If there was in the "Karl Marx" the Congress of the
Party met, here in the Plaza de la Revolución the People's Congress
meets to express its support for the agreements of the Congress
(applause). But if we vote there, we must vote here too
(applause).”112
The second modality of the expression of mass solidarity was through
the mechanism of voting. That required resort to the traditional device
of elections, in the case of constitutional reform through the
organization of a plebiscite in which the masses, under the
leadership of the PCC, would express their approval of the work of
del proceso; el trabajo relacionado con la movilización de masas, las asambleas
diferentes que hay que llevar a cabo. ¡Ahí han estado presentes los Comités de
Defensa de la Revolución!”).
111 Fidel Castro Ruz, Commander in Chief of Cuba, Speech Delivered at the First
Congress of the Communist Party of Cuba (Dec. 22, 1975),
http://www.cuba.cu/gobierno/discursos/1975/esp/c221275e.html
(Pero,
además, este Congreso ha reflejado la extraordinaria unidad de nuestro pueblo y
de nuestro Partido. Y ha sido un Congreso profundamente justo y profundamente
humano.").
112 Id. (“Si allí en el "Carlos Marx" se reunió el Congreso del Partido, aquí en la
Plaza de la Revolución se reúne el Congreso del pueblo para expresar su apoyo a
los acuerdos del Congreso (APLAUSOS). Pero si allí votamos, aquí debemos votar
también (APLAUSOS).”).
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the PCC and its organs evidenced in the Constitutional draft
(ostensibly amended in light of popular commentary). The
referendum was held on 15 February 1976 and served as the first
time since before 1959 that the Cuban people were permitted to
participate in a nationwide vote. It was overwhelmingly
approved.113 This is not meant to be the same as elections in liberal
democratic states, but to reflect the assent of the people to the
product of the process in which they had a direct involvement. At
the same time, it was said to close the transitional period, and to
that extent, might have been thought to be consigned to that
familiar dustbin of history. “Así dicho se obvia que la Constitución
de 1976 significó el cierre del Período de Provisionalidad,
interregno útil a la progresiva institucionalización del naciente
Estado revolucionario, y que por lo tanto, algunas de las
prescripciones constitucionales ya tenían precedente en leyes y
prácticas
políticas
anterior114

E. The Template for Constitutional Plebiscite
As is now clearer, by 1975, the Cuban revolutionary leading
group was faced with a conundrum for the establishment of its
As noted above in the data on the voting for the 1976 Cuba Constitution
referendum. Kuba, 15. Februar 1976: Verfassung, DATABASE AND SEARCH
ENGINE
FOR
DIRECT
DEMOCRACY,
https://www.sudd.ch/event.php?lang=en&id=cu011976.
114 (Teodoro) Yan Guzman Hernández, Los Mecanismos de Democracia Directa en
Cuba: Diseño Normativo y Práctica, 25 PERFILES LATINOAMERICANOS, 103, 103127 (2017) (“El tránsito de la LF1959 a la Constitución de 1976 trajo consigo la única
consulta popular en las urnas de la historia constitucional de Cuba; la decisión fue
adoptada por el Consejo de Ministros y el Buró Político del Partido Comunista.
Esa consulta fue calificada como referendo (Vega, 1988: p. 119; Azcuy, 2004: p. 83,
Guanche, 2011: p. 42), y además de que se oficializó con esa denominación (Ley
No 1229/1975), justo recayó sobre la Constitución vigente para su aprobación.
Previamente se había sometido a debate popular el anteproyecto, por lo que el
pueblo podía modificar su contenido; pero la mayoría de esos cambios fueron
poco sustanciales, basta comparar el anteproyecto con la Constitución aprobada. *
* * Algunos consideran a esta consulta popular de aprobación de la Constitución
cubana en 1975 como un plebiscito vinculante (Altman, 2005: p. 218; Hevia, 2010:
p. 177), otros han minimizado la trascendencia del proceso de elaboración de la
Constitución de 1976, que involucró una participación directa sui generis (el
debate popular) con un MDD, arguyendo que este (el proceso en su totalidad)
ocurrió en un ambiente autoritario (Vergottini, 2009: p. 146), o con falta de
libertades públicas (Asensi, 1996: p. 63).”).
113
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legitimacy. On the one hand, the revolutionary government was by
1975 firmly Marxist Leninist in a classically European sense. It had
already made clear its rejection of the Chinese path toward Leninist
state organization,115 and it rejected any tilt of Marxist economics
grounded in state directed markets theory.116 On the other hand, its
form embraced the original contradiction of Marxist-Leninist
states—the centrality of class struggle and the primacy of workerpeasant solidarity given voice through the vanguard—required a
more direct incorporation of popular participation directly in the
constitution of the state and administrative apparatus, as well as in
the formulation of the basic conceptualization of the economic and
political model. Yet this engagement with the masses were to be
undertaken even as a primary responsibility of the Leninist
vanguard was to guide the masses toward a better understanding
of its role within a Marxist state.
For the Cuban state leaders, the solution appeared in two
tracks. On the one hand, ‘the masses were to be engaged in the
process of formulating theory and institutional charters.’ On the
other they were to ‘affirm or assent to the adoption of those
documents—at the instance of the vanguard—through the
traditional mechanics of voting.’ At the same time, engagement was
understood to serve as a means of socializing the masses and
leading them to a proper understanding of the tasks and of the
necessary content of theory and the necessary character of the
institutions of state and Party. Likewise, affirmation acts were not
to be understood as liberal democratic elections or voting.
Acclamation could be manifested in mass assemblies; and it could
also be managed through referendum.

See Yinghong Cheng, Sino-Cuban Relations During the Early Years of the Castro
Regime, 1959–1966, 9 J. OF COLD WAR STUD. 78, 78-114 (2007); William R. Garner,
The Sino-Soviet Ideological Struggle in Latin America, 10 J. OF INTER-AM. STUD. 244, 244
(1968).
116 These ideas were reaffirmed in the 4th PCC Congress. See, e.g., Javier Corrales,
The Gatekeeper State: Limited Economic Reforms and Regime Survival in Cuba, 1989–
2002, 39 LATIN AM. RES. REV. 35, 35-65 (2004) in DEBATING CUBAN EXCEPTIONALISM.
STUDIES OF THE AMERICAS 61, 61-88 (Bert Hoffmann & Laurence Whitehead eds.,
2007; Bert Hoffman, Transformation and Continuity in Cuba, 33 REV. OF RADICAL POL.
ECON. 1, 1-20 (2001)). See, e.g., Al Campbell, Planning in Cuba Today, 34 INT’L J. OF
POL. ECON. 65, 65-83 (2014) (for a discussion of the embrace of central planning and
the rejection of markets from the 1970s).
115

90

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI INT’L & COMP. L. REV.

Vol. 27:1

The process of constitutionalizing the state around the
paramount political leadership of the Cuban Communist Party
(PCC) undertaken during the course of the 1st POC Congress, the
process of managing popular engagement, of responding to that
engagement with changes to draft documents, and thereafter of
securing mass approval, set the template for each of these action in
the future. For us—as we undertake the close study of the process
of securing constitutional revision—first through the leading
elements of the PCC, then through drafting committee and POC
Congress, and then through the organization of mass power, to
popular consultation and thereafter to be affirmed through a
national plebiscite, the actions of state and party in 1975 provide
both a baseline and the conceptual starting point for the eventual
development of Cuban theories of Socialist Democracy.117
At the same time, it is important to distinguish
constitutionalizing action separated by almost a generation, and
made more remote by the profound changed in the world as well
as in Cuba since the adoption of the 1976 Constitution and the
organization of the institutional structures of the PCC. For one
thing, that branch of Soviet Marxist Leninism has withered on the
vine.118 Its last real theorist, however, was Fidel Castro himself.119
Yet Cuba's own engagement with Leninism as the remnant of
Soviet ideology has been profoundly challenged both by regional
changes and by the vigorous development of 21st century Chinese
Marxist Leninism. China provides both support and inspiration,
but at the same time a challenge to Cuban ideology. That challenge
intensifies to the extent to which Cuba remains committed to classic
class struggle, continues to reject the market as inherently a device
of capitalist imperialism, and continues to define itself against the
United States (as the ultimate 'other'). At the same time, China's
influence has grown as its interest in Cuba has deepened and as its
international importance has expanded. Moreover, by 2018, the
See William M. Leogrande, The Communist Party of Cuba Since the First Congress,
12 J. OF LATIN AM. STUD. 397, 397-419 (1980); Wiliam M. Leogrande, Party
Development in Revolutionary Cuba, 21 J. OF INTER-AM. STUD. AND WORLD AFF. 457,
457-480 (1979) (on the process of producing the work of the 1st PCC Congress and
the role of the various stakeholders in Cuba).
118 FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN (1992) (recounting
this most famously from a Western perspective).
119 BACKER, supra note 3.
117
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PCC itself had already developed quite distinct markers of
participation that went well beyond the highly controlled
engagement that was at the center of mass participation in 1975.
Thus, it is important to start with 1975 as the baseline for
methodologies, and perhaps theories of mass participation. At the
same time, those baseline templates were themselves transformed
starting with the movement, after Raúl Castro's assumption of apex
authority within the FAR and the PCC, and the development of
more open textured (by Cuban standards) methods for popular
engagement in what became the PCC's Lineamientos, and
thereafter its reconceptualization of the political and economic
model, and now the 2019 Constitution. What are the central
elements of that template? The central elements of this template
begin when Cuba’s PCC adopted something that to American eyes
appears to look suspiciously like a corporate governance model,
one grounded in the fundamental principle that a core leadership
is vested with the authority to manage the affairs of state solely in
the interests of the collective (shareholders) with the day to day
work of administration undertaken by its officers (or officials).120
That translates in Leninist terms to the following—all political
change must originate in the PCC. At the same time the PCC is
constrained by its own line to the sorts of political projects it might
initiate, as well as with respect to its contents.
Legitimacy requires affirmation by the masses, the way the key
board proposals require shareholder approval.121 The object of this
See, e.g., Melvin A. Eisenberg, An Overview of the Principles of Corporate
Governance, 48 THE BUS. LAW. 1271 (1993) (on this standard governance model of
corporations). See Harold Seidman, The Theory of the Autonomous Government
Corporation: A Critical Appraisal, 12 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 89 (1952) (on the theorization
of political power as a corporation, and the American model of domestic
governance).
121 SCOTT BOWMAN, MODERN CORPORATION AND AMERICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT:
LAW, POWER, AND IDEOLOGY (2010) (analyzing this and other analogies in detail).
Here, one makes a connection not just between models of liberal democratic
politics but also with its principles of corporate governance. See, e.g., John Pound,
The Rise of the Political Model of Corporate Governance and Corporate Control, 8 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1003 (1993). But the model does not run solely from the political to the
corporate—it can run the other way as well—so as corporate governance is
sometimes said to embrace the ideologies of the liberal democracies (see Lisa M.
Fairfax, The Future of Shareholder Democracy, 84 IND. L.J. 1259 (2009) (for an example
with respect to shareholder democracy principles), states may also adopt
120
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approval under the guidance of the PCC, is in part to legitimate the
PCC's work, but also to educate the masses and move the PCC's
project forward of socializing the masses into appropriate class
consciousness and thus of advancing their loyalty to the revolution
and its principles. To that extent, and again borrowing an analogy
from American corporate practice—engagement was to be
structured and managed in ways that contemporary Americans
would recognize as corporate or small town "town hall
meetings".122 One of us have referred to this as Populist
Technocracy and Engagement.123 In this context, Western
references to the USSR incorporated,124 or China, Inc.,125 assume a
constitutional or at least a normatively constitutive dimension.
The Constitution follows the development of political principle
and remains subordinate to those principles. In this sense, the
constitution memorializes the normative structures the control of
which is delegated to the PCC and the content of which is subject
to its own development of Marxism and Leninism in context.126 As
such, constitutional reform is both a consequential event (and in
this sense a technical rather than a normative project) and
constrained by core premises and principles which may not be
corporate governance principles in their operations (through delegations of broad
authority to leadership collectives onto which substantial discretionary power is
vested).
122 See Gary Tomlinson, Building a Culture of High Employee Engagement, 3 STRATEGIC
HUMAN RESOURCES REV. 25 (2010) (on the impact of town hall meetings on
employee morale). See also Interview by Jim Blasingame with Harold Lacy (Jan. 11,
1999),
https://www.smallbusinessadvocate.com/small-businessinterviews/harold-lacy-2; William Hubbartt, "Town Hall" Meetings Good For
Employee Morale, THE SMALL BUSINESS ADVOCATE (Apr. 15, 2003),
https://www.smallbusinessadvocate.com/small-business-articles/town-hallmeetings-good-for-employee-morale-2.
123 Larry Catá Backer, On the Practice of Town Hall Meetings in Shared Governance—
Populist Technocracy and Engagement at Penn State, MONITORING UNIVERSITY
GOVERNANCE (June 17, 2015), https://lcbpsusenate.blogspot.com/2015/06/onpractice-of-town-hall-meetings-in.html (last visited Aug. 6, 2019).
124 See, e.g., T. H. Rigby, Staffing USSR Incorporated: The Origins of the Nomenklatura
System, 40 J. OF SOVIET STUD.
523, 523-537 (1988).
125 See, e.g., TED FISHMAN, CHINA, INC.: HOW THE RISE OF THE NEXT SUPERPOWER
CHALLENGES AMERICA AND THE WORLD (Scribner, 2006).
126 See, e.g., Larry Catá Backer, Party, People, Government, and State: On Constitutional
Values and the Legitimacy of the Chinese State-Party Rule of Law System, 30 BOS. U.
INT'L L. J. 331, 331-408 (2012) (in the Chinese context).
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challenged through the process of constitutional reform. The basic
relationship between constitutional reform and the PCC political
line, then constrains and shapes the nature of popular engagement
(by defining what may or may not be suggested) and by then
providing the mechanisms for weighing the value of such
contributions. It is in that sense that any engagement in which
suggestions for the abandonment of central planning (for example)
would just not register on those charged with receiving popular
suggestions.
Still, nothing is sacred about the forms of popular affirmation.
Mass events are as legitimate as traditional voting. Moreover, mass
engagement must be organized through the institutions of mass
revolutionary discipline—for example the committees for the
Defense of the Revolution, who themselves are committed to
moving forward the PCC line against "reactionary" and dissident
elements. It is in that sense that one could conceive of the process
as entirely democratic, even as it severely constrained by the form
and content of debate. It is also important to note that the notion of
affirmation itself is understood as ministerial in the sense that it
follows from and ought to reflect the popular 'buy in' resulting from
the process of mass engagement in the development of the final
draft. It is in that sense unnecessary and the understanding is that
only those things (and candidates) that must be approved or
affirmed would be brought to a vote in the first place.127 Socialist
consultation produces the consensus and agreement which is a
predicate for a vote that merely serves as a mechanism for
memorializing that consensus through a discrete mass act (of
voting).
And in the end, Fidel Castro could look at the
institutionalization of revolutionary political power in the PCC,
and popular power in the Nacional Assemble and see the
After the fall of the Soviet Union, the notion of pre-approval of candidates by
the ruling Party has been more or less ignored by scholarship, even though a
similar system is still practiced in China. Scholarship has instead examined notions
of managed democracy, a more or less direct derivation of the pre -existing system.
See TIMOTHY J. COLTON & MICHAEL MCFAUL, POPULAR CHOICE AND MANAGED
DEMOCRACY: THE RUSSIAN ELECTIONS OF 1999 AND 2000 (2003) (on Russia). See also
QINGSHAN FORREST TAN, VILLAGE ELECTIONS IN CHINA: DEMOCRATIZING THE
COUNTRYSIDE (2006) (on China).
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perpetuation of a singular popular authority. “Our revolutionary
process was, from the beginning, profoundly popular and solidly
rooted in the masses. The first sovereign act of the people was the
revolution itself."128 But these institutions did not spring forward
fully formed from the theoretical droppings of Leninist theory
applied elsewhere (though those might prove useful post hoc). We
have already encountered the challenge perceived by the Cuban
revolutionary government after the 2nd Havana Declaration
respecting the modalities of mass approval assemblies and the
beginnings of efforts to change the model without endangering (at
least at a general level) its theoretical (and ideological) premises.
Those experiments reached a threshold of success in the years
immediately before they were nationalized through during the 1st
PCC Congress and then memorialized in the 1976 Constitution.
Fidel Castro noted their importance in key speeches from 1974,
referencing for example, the Poderes Populares experiment in
Matanzas Province. “And another important reason, the emphasis
that the Revolution desires to give this most important
revolutionary experiment that is being realized in Matanzas
Province with the constitution of the Poderes Populares, that you
people of Matanzas have embraced with such enthusiasm and have
supported so warmly."129
That experiment could be seen as producing a template for the
creation of local, provincial and national popular assemblies, and
in the process replace the mechanism of mass affirmation of the
people physically present in a large space with a representative
body. But that movement also triggered the fundamental
contradiction of representative assemblies—the notion that they
could not in form or operation, replicate the corruption and class
exploitation principles of the form which the revolutionary
government had attacked with such force in the course of the
genesis of the two Havana declarations. And thus, the need for
Translated from Discurso Pronunciado Por Fidel Castro Ruz, Presidente De La
República De Cuba, En La Sesion Solemne De Constitucion De La Asamblea
Nacional Del Poder Popular, Celebrada En El Teatro "Carlos Marx", El 2 De
Diciembre De 1976, "Año Del Xx Aniversario Del Granma". [The Solemn Session
of the Constitution of the National Assembly of the Popular Power] (Dec. 2, 1976)
(Statement by Fidel Castro Ruz, President of the Republic of Cuba) (available at:
http://www.cuba.cu/gobierno/discursos/1976/esp/f021276e.html).
129 Translated from id.
128
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experiment—in its pragmatic but also its fundamental ideological
dimensions.
As you know, a decision was taken to undertake this
experiment in this province [Matanzas]. It was an
experiment in a sense, but not one respecting the decision
[to proceed itself] or [respecting the] security of our Party
to carry forward these ideas throughout the country; the
experiment is precisely to put to the test the methods, the
mechanisms, the regulations and everything that concerns
the constitution of the Popular Powers before applying it
nationally. That is, the experiment will teach us to perfect
the idea; but the idea is to apply these principles to the
entire country.130
Part of that also involved the so-called rationalization of the
provinces, a process that required the subdivision of the traditional
provinces. The object in part was to make more practical the
division of provincial popular assemblies in the service of locality,
state and PCC. “One becomes a little sentimental when one thinks
about dividing some of the provinces, but tied to that issue is the
question of the organization of Poderes Populares [popular
assemblies]. For the adequate establishment of the Poderes
Populares it is necessary for the size and extent of provinces to be
more rational."131
Implicit in that rationalization were two insights with political
effect. The first was that mass assemblies could not be relied on for
the exercise of popular affirmation of PCC leadership. The second
was that such assemblies would have to be institutionalized if they
were to serve the PCC and the administrative apparatus in an
ideologically useful way. That sovereign affirmation could then be
Translated from id.
Translated from Discurso Pronunciado Por El Comandante En Jefe Fidel Castro
Ruz, Primer Secretario Del Comite Central Del Partido Comunista De Cuba Y
Primer Ministro Del Gobierno Revolucionario, En El Acto Central En
Conmemoracion Del Xxi Aniversario Del Ataque Al Cuartel Moncada, Efectuado
En La Explanada Frente Al Estado Mayor Del Ejercito Central, En Matanzas, El 26
De Julio De 1974, "Año Del Xv Aniversario". Fidel Castro Ruz, Commander in
Chief of Cuba, Speech delivered to the City of Santa Clara (Jul. 26, 1975), available
at: http://www.cuba.cu/gobierno/discursos/1975/esp/f260775e.html.
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utilized to reconstitute itself pragmatically along institutional lines,
but one in which sovereign power remains undivided. “Power is
unified, that of the workers, which is exercised through the
National Assembly and the state organs which depend on it."132
All of these centripetal forces, the experimentation in large part
in reaction to outside and internal challenges, produced a longterm process of solidification the contours of which might have
been evident early on, but the character of which eventually also
represented the culmination of reactionary political calculus. Note
here that this is not to suggest ideological reaction; rather the focus
is on the nature of the relational dynamics between the
revolutionary apparatus and the challenges which it confronted in
its formative years. Those dynamics were politically reactionary
(one responds pragmatically to political challenges) even as they
became, in political reaction, ideologically the opposite. To that
end, this leads to the development of what we call Cuba’s Socialist
Democracy 1.0, which is the outcome of the internal challenges that
we have discussed thus far.

F. Socialist Democracy 1.0.
From the late mid-1960s, the search for a form of a collective
decision-making alternative to multi-party elections proceeded on
two different levels. At the grassroots-level, the format of the
plebiscite was maintained and adopted on a much smaller scale,
through the formation of committees representing neighborhoods,
and other groups defined along the lines of class, gender, and
age.133 At the national level, the spontaneity of experiments in
socialist democracy was encased within a governance model of
Leninist derivation, emphasizing vertical lines of authority.
Governance structures realized through political and legal
cooperation with the Soviet Union were layered over the earlier
revolutionary and classically Socialist substratum.
Without doubt, a decisive role in this process was played by
the merger of Castro’s 26th of July movement with the Popular
132
133

Translated from id.
Translated from Rojas supra note 65; cf. Buch, supra note 66.

2019

POPULAR CONSULTATION AND REFERENDUM

97

Socialist Party and the Revolutionary Director, and the pouring of
these Caribbean identities in the vessel of the Cuban Communist
Party. These choices posed the revolutionary government with the
responsibility to continue to articulate autonomous notions of
exogenous socialist democracy, while complying with Muscovite
governance methods based on endogenous socialist democracy.
The transition to a Soviet-inspired model of state and societal
governance was largely foreseeable. Muscovite prescriptions had
already been adopted by the People’s Republic of China, North
Korea, and Eastern Europe, albeit with varying degrees of success
and efficiency.
Less foreseeable, was the temporary side-lining of
exogenous forms of socialist democracy. Institutionalization and
the creation of the Asamblea Nacional del Poder Popular were meant
to make the workings of the Cuban administrative machinery more
manageable and efficient, regular, and predictable. The result was
a measure of compliance with the Soviet model of State
governance.134 The features common to Soviet forms of endogenous
democracy and the Cuban Revolution however did not extend
beyond limitation of the demos along class lines, and leadership by
a group or a leader that personified the Revolution.135 Therefore, an
ample space existed to combine Cuban notions of endogenous
socialist democracy with practices based on the Soviet model. Cuba
was the only country within the Socialist camp where mass
affirmation events with a constitutive character were held.136 In
Castro Ruz, supra note 101 (Here, direct references to the Soviet version of
Socialist ideology abound, with the name of Karl Marx being mentioned 7 times,
that of Lenin 4 times and the Soviet Union characterized as the head of world
progressivist forces. Such references to Soviet ideology were absent from both the
First and the Second Havana declarations, where Castro instead mounted a
vigorous defense of the Cuban nature of the revolution.).
135 See LESZEK KOŁAKOWSKI, MAIN CURRENTS OF MARXISM 792 (P. S. Falla trans., 2d
ed. 1978).
136 Michael Bothe, The 1968 Constitution of East Germany: A Codification of MarxistLeninist Ideas on State and Government, 17 AM. J. COMP. L. 268, 268-291 (1969) (No
other country adhering to the Soviet Bloc organized a popular referendum
between the end of World War II, and the fall of the Soviet Union. The only
exception was the 1968 constitutional referendum held in the German Democratic
Republic. Despite its formal similarities with the Cuban referendum of 1976, this
referendum did not play the same role in the construction of notions of socialist
democracy. By 1968, the GDR had already fully articulated local conceptions of
socialist democracy.).
134
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China, the invocation of the sovereign will of the people had often
resulted in the undoing of governance institutions, rather than to
their creation. In the German Democratic Republic, political parties
were established to provide a safe haven to former Nazis, displaced
populations, and other categories. Differently from Cuban
revolutionary assemblies, these parties were not a source of
constituent power, and therefore their approval of decisions taken
by the leadership was scarcely relevant.
In Cuba, the adoption of enduring institutional forms took
place with an overhaul of the 1959 Ley Fundamental, and
promulgation of a new Constitution. The 1976 Constitution in turn
could not come to life without an act of sovereign approval by the
people. Given the absence of viable models within the Socialist
camp, institutionalization of mass approval proceeded along the
path traced by revolutionary practices of mass democracy, the 1940
Constitution,137 and the Ley Fundamental.138 The manifestation of the
sovereign, constitutive will of the people developed along two
partially distinct lines. The first one of them saw approbation of
decisions taken by the leadership of the Communist Party of Cuba
on behalf of the entire people. The second line of development
involved popular consultation and referendum vote. An instance
of approbation is given by the vote on the resolutions of the First
Congress of the CPC. The rally that took place on the Plaza de la
Revolución in December 1975139 was not a constitutive rally, given
manifestations of constitutive power were no longer necessary in
the face of institutionalization.
More significant was Cuba’s choice to preserve the
referendum as a legitimate channel through which the sovereign
will of the people could continue to find a constructive expression.
Such a decision stemmed not from an unwilling retention of models
inspired by liberal democratic constitutional theory,140 but by the
difficulties in representation caused by mass rallies. If Fidel was
Cuba’s Constitution of 1976 with Amendments Through 2002, CONSTITUTE
PROJECT
(2019),
https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Cuba_2002.pdf?lang=en.
138 Id. at art.27-28.
139 Castro Ruz, supra note 111.
140 REPUBLICA DE CUBA CONSTITUCIÓN POLITICA DE 1940 (Jul. 1, 1940), available at
http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions/Cuba/cuba1940.html.
137
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searching for forms of “pure” - “pasteurized”, in his words –
democracy, it soon became clear that mass rallies had limitations
not compatible with the principles of Cuban socialist democracy.
The constitutive and non-constitutive mass rallies held until the
mid-1970s could include fellow Latin Americans in the demos,
bestowing Cuban political citizenship on persons of non-Cuban
nationality. But Cubans who lived in the Eastern provinces of the
Island were routinely excluded from mass events taking place in
Havana. Their absence was due not to a rejection of their role within
socialist democracy, but to their mere inability to travel to Havana.
Thus, they found themselves in a position analogous to those
whom, in liberal democracies, could not exert their right to vote due
to illiteracy, poverty, or other socio-economic hurdles.
A solution was found in submitting the Draft Constitution
to popular consultation, and then to popular vote. These more
regular, orderly events could provide the opportunity to
participate in decision-making to all those who lived in Cuba. The
soliciting of popular comments on the Draft Constitution took place
simultaneous to the holding of the First Congress of the Communist
Party of Cuba, in the spring of 1975.141 To ensure an effective
participation by the people, these two events had to occur at the
same time. The resolution to hold the referendum was conveyed
through the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Cuba.
The Central Committee noted how:142
The First Congress of the Communist Party of Cuba, in
consequence, gives its approval to the improved text of
the Draft Constitution and recommends that it be
officially published as the Constitution Project of the
Republic and submitted by referendum to the universal,
free and secret vote of citizens, together with the
Constitutional Transit Bill; that the referendum be
organized so that all citizens with the right to vote have
the opportunity to vote in it, for which polling places must
Fidel Castro Ruz, Commander in Chief of Cuba, Speech Delivered at First Party
Congress
(May
29,
1975),
(available
at:
http://lanic.utexas.edu/project/castro/db/1975/19750529.html.).
142 I CONGRESSO DEL PCC: TESIS Y RESOLUCIONES SOBRE LA CONSTITUCÍON Y LEY DE
TRÁNSITO CONSTITUCIONAL, citing Granma (Dec. 26, 1975), at 3.
141
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be established with reference not only to domicile, but
also to where the voters are located ( . . . )143
This solution preserved the truly essential features of earlier
forms of exogenous socialist democracy. These were popular
participation, and leadership responsibility towards the people.
Popular participation occurred by comments on the Draft
Constitution – a process that other Marxist-Leninist systems would
launch much later in China when the government began to increase
the role of market mechanisms in the economic systems during the
State-owned enterprise reform of 1979. If data about unofficial
comments made during the popular consultation on the 2018
Constitution is available, the same information is not available for
the 1976 consultation. The feature of leadership responsibility
towards the people, however, is visible in the results of the 1976
referendum.
Popular choice was strongly in favor of the new
Constitution. On 15th February 1976, 5,602,973 Cuban citizens went
to the polls. The voter turnout was of 98 percent. Of 5,523,604 valid
votes, 99.02 percent were in favor of the Socialist constitution,144
and only 54,070 votes against it. 44,221 ballots were blank, and
31,148 were annulled. The object of the plebiscite was not to secure
a majority vote. Majoritarian vote is a feature of multi-party
systems. Within a Socialist democracy, vote is instead designed to
provide a signal of the extent to which the Party in power is able to
effectively fulfil its responsibility of leading the population towards
their chosen path of development. As seen from this perspective,
all votes are of equal importance, included the 54,070 votes against
the 1976 Constitution, blank and invalid ballots. Votes approving
the 1976 Constitution signaled how 99.02 per cent of Cubans
believed the Communist Party of Cuba pursued the trajectory of
change chosen by the people in the best possible way. The other
Larry Catá Backer, Part I (Caribbean Socialist Democracy 1.0; the 1976 Constitution)
Caribbean Marxism's Socialist Democracy Series, Considering the Cuban Constitutional
Project, From Communist Party to Popular Plebiscite, LAW AT THE END OF THE DAY
(Feb. 22, 2019, 11:16 PM), http://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/2019/02/part-icaribbean-socialist-democracy-10.html.
144 Beat Müller, Kuba, 15. February 1976: Verfassung [Cuba, Feb 15, 1976:
Constitution], https://www.sudd.ch/event.php?lang=en&id=cu011976 (last
visited Aug. 6, 2019) (Ger.).
143
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129,439 votes signaled how an equal number of Cubans thought
that a fine-tuning or re-adjustment in the methods chosen to realize
Cuba’s path of development may have been necessary. Electoral
choice then was not performed to approve or deny the leadership
role of the Communist Party of Cuba, but to provide and obtain
feed-back on specific methods of governance. After all the 1976
Constitutional referendum saw Cubans vote on a document they
had contributed to making through the popular consultation.
Therefore any vote on the Constitution was, in its truest essence, a
vote about one’s own goals, and an opinion on the suitability of the
means chosen to achieve those goals.
The Constitution of 1976 “conceived of Popular Power as
an organizational structure of the State, and popular sovereignty
and socialist democracy”145 as the basic principles of Caribbean
Marxism-Leninism. The notion of popular power as an
organizational structure of the state was enshrined throughout the
Preamble. The most immediate effect of this act of approval was
encasing popular consultations and referendums within the
structure of the Asamblea Nacional del Poder Popular. Popular will
should have undergone the same process of institutionalization
and regularization witnessed by other organizational structures of
Cuba’s governance apparatus. After all, the logic behind the
Leninist model was geared towards a clockwork regularity and
predictability of governance processes, and such was also Castro’s
aspiration.

SOCIALIST CONSULTATIVE DEMOCRACY 2.0, THE 2019 CUBAN
CONSTITUTIONAL PROJECT AND ITS HISTORICAL-IDEOLOGICAL
CONTEXT.
With the transition of government from Fidel to Raúl Castro,
Cuba saw a more conscious revival of the role of popular
affirmation in the construction of a political relationship between
the collective masses and the core governing political vanguard.
But that revival was undertaken in coordination with renewed
measures for popular consultations both through the Asamblea as
145

(Teodoro) Yan Guzman Hernández, supra note 114, at 104.
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a representative organ, and for important matters, for direct
consultations. If it is clear that popular affirmation is incorporated
as an important element of Cuban political practice, it is less clear
what popular affirmation is, and why Cuba’s mechanisms of choice
are those of the popular consultation and of the referendum.

A. The Road from Socialist Consultative Democracy 1.0 to 2.0.
The core element in the institutionalization of the Cuban
revolutionary government, and its establishment of its Socialist
Democracy 1.0, centered on the formal sidelining of mass popular
gatherings (whose use had been serendipitous since the early 1960s
in any case), and on the substitution of the Asamblea Nacional as
an institutional form for popular expression. That substitution,
however, brought the revolutionary government to adopt the forms
of liberal democratic representation and in the process, it also
brought the revolutionary government perilously close to the
adoption of the principles of liberal democratic governmental
organization. The revolutionary government was to some extent
sensitive to these issues in 1976, and Fidel Castro went out of his
way to declare the difference between the forms of liberal
democratic legislatures and those of the Asamblea Nacional.146
And not just Fidel Castro. Early on Raúl Castro also sought to
articulate Soviet Leninist principles to legitimate the construction
of a system under the leadership of the vanguard party, but also
one that necessarily was dependent on a relationship between the
vanguard and the masses (starting with the proletariat, of course,
in a political worldview shaped by classical Soviet notions of class
struggle (again without reference to failures of implementation)).
In a speech given May 4, 1973, Raúl Castro emphasized an
approach that sought to distance the institutions of proletarian
dictatorship from the dictatorship of a legislature in liberal
democracies.
But the dictatorship of the proletariat is not limited in the
least to the important and main role that the Party must
146

Castro Ruz, supra note 39.
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play. The Party is only the vanguard minority of the most
advanced social class in charge of leading and carrying on
its shoulders the bulk of the weight in the construction of
socialism. Therefore, in order to exercise its leading role
visà-vis the entire society, the Party relies on the state, the
mass organizations and, when necessary, on the direct
mobilization of the working masses. The most ideal and
direct instrument for exercising control of society is not a
political party, but rather the state, an apparatus without
which neither the dictatorship nor the fulfillment of the
tasks of socialist construction are possible. In addition to
the Party and the state, the complete system of the
dictatorship of the proletariat includes the mass
organizations, which Lenin called “transmission belts”
that group together one or many sectors of society’s
revolutionary forces: the trade unions, youth, women’s
and peasants’ organizations, the Committees for the
Defense of Revolution, students and Pioneers. In an
article written in December 1920, Lenin said that the
dictatorship “cannot work without a number of
‘transmission belts’ running from the vanguard to the
mass of the advanced class, and from the latter to the mass
of the working people.”147
These notions were built into the mutually reinforcing
provisions of the 1976 Constitution (revised 2002) which provided
on the one hand, in Article 5, that "The Communist Party of Cuba,
Martian and of Marxist-Leninist, the organized vanguard of the
Cuban nation, is the superior leading force of the society and the
State, organizing and guiding the common efforts aimed at the
highest goals of the construction of socialism and advancement
toward the communist society."148 On the other hand, the 1976

Raúl Castro, Commander of the Revolutionary Armed Forces, Speech delivered
to cadres and officials of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Cuba
(May 4, 1973) (transcript available at https://liberationschool.org/07-03-01democratic-centralism-in-communi-html/).
148 CUBA CONST. Art. 5 (1976), as amended through 2002 (Constitution Project
trans.),
(https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Cuba_2002.pdf?lang=en) (In
the original: “["El Partido Comunista de Cuba, martiano y marxista-leninista,
vanguardia organizada de la nación cubana, es la fuerza dirigente superior de la
147
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Constitution also provided, in Article 69, that "The National
Assembly of People’s Power is the supreme organ of State power
and represents and expresses the sovereign will of all the working
people."149 And, in Article 70, it provided that "The National
Assembly of People’s Power is the only organ in the Republic
invested with constituent and legislative authority."150
And yet the problem remained—and grew substantially in the
period between 1986 and 2008 when direct popular affirmation and
engagement became a vestigial part of the operation of the
administrative apparatus of the state.151 The core operating system,
the political-economic model guiding state action was established
in the course of the 4th PCC Congress, which cemented the notion
of central planning as the core of macro-economic policy and the
vanguard role of the PCC as both leader and operator of the state.152
Both consultation and engagement was telescoped into the
Asamblea Nacional and, to the extent useful, the mass
organizations already operating under the leadership of the PCC.153
sociedad y del Estado, que organiza y orienta los esfuerzos comunes hacía los altos
fines de la construcción del socialismo y el avance hacía la sociedad comunista.").
149 CUBA CONST. Art. 69 (1976), as amended through 2002 (Constitution Project
trans.),
(https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Cuba_2002.pdf?lang=en) (In
the original: "La Asamblea Nacional del Poder Popular es el órgano supremo del
poder del Estado. Representa y expresa la voluntad soberana de todo el pueblo.").
150 CUBA CONST. Art. 70 (1976), as amended through 2002 (Constitution Project
trans.),
(https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Cuba_2002.pdf?lang=en) (In
the original: "La Asamblea Nacional del Poder Popular es el único órgano con
potestad constituyente y legislativa en la República.").
151 See, e.g., Jorge I. Domínguez, Cuba in the 1980s, 65:1 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 118 (1986)
(on the operation of the Cuban State-Party system after the 1970s); Juan M. Del
Águila, Reflections on a Non-transition in Cuba: Comments on Elites, 9 CUBA IN
TRANSITION 192 (1999); see generally PHILIP BRENNER, MARGUERITE ROSE JIMÉNEZ,
JOHN M. KIRK & WILLIAM M. LEOGRANDE, EDS., A CONTEMPORARY CUBA READER:
REINVENTING THE REVOLUTION (2007); JORGE I. DOMÍNGUEZ, CUBA: ORDER AND
REVOLUTION (2009).
152 See, e.g., GAIL REED, ISLAND IN THE STORM: THE CUBAN COMMUNIST PARTY'S
FOURTH CONGRESS (1992)(on the 4th PCC Congress); Juan M. Del Águila, The Party,
the Fourth Congress, and the Process of Counter-Reform, CUBAN STUDIES 71 (1993).
153 As for instance the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution (Comités de
Defensa de la Revolución), the Federation of Cuban Women (Federación de
Mujeres Cubanas), etc. See generally, Benigno E. Aguirre, The Conventionalization of
Collective Behavior in Cuba, 90 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY 541 (1984)(on mass
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This was ironic, especially since this period of institutional stability
was also marked by periods of great political instability, great
crises, culminating in the disappearance of the Soviet Union and
the trials of the so-called "Special Period."154 And yet, it was
precisely during these periods that neither engagement nor
consultation outside the organs established by the 1st PCC Congress
was attempted.155 More telling was the paucity of theoretical
development after the 4th PCC Congress on either point.156
At first glance, the problem appears centered on a concern
about the corruption of the system from a "right" perspective—that
is that the national assembly system does not work because one
cannot extricate the form of the national assembly institution from
the liberal democratic ideals of representative democracy. If that is
the case then any mechanism for representation necessarily
requires autonomous choices by an electorate. And, indeed, that
had been the way that even the revolutionary government
approached the issue.
However, it is not clear that the primary problem of the national
assembly system was the risk of the possibility of "rightist" error
(that is the possibility that the national assembly system would be
corrupted by and eventually transform itself into a corrupted form
of a liberal democratic representative institution). That risk was
both well understood, and at least partially theorized. To the extent
organizations ); Benigno E. Aguirre, Social Control in Cuba, 44 LATIN AMERICAN
POLITICS AND SOCIETY 67 (2002).
154 Ernesto Perez Castillo, Cuba’s Special Period: the Bogeyman, HAVANA TIMES (May
10,
2019)
https://havanatimes.org/opinion/cubas-special-period-thebogeyman/.
155 The mechanisms of popular consultation and of the referendum, were not used
during the special period, despite being the only legitimate channels of popular
expression in the eyes of the Cuban leadership. The Central Committee of the PCC
instead adopted a resolution endowing the Committee with special faculties
(facultades excepcionales), essentially broad powers to adopt the political and
economic decision needed to face the Special Period. See Resolución que Faculta a
Comité Central del Partido para Tomar las Decisiones en Correspondencia con la Situación
que Vive el País, GRANMA (Oct. 23,1991), at 6.
156 The only document approved by the 4th Congress relevant to political
participation was a resolution “On Perfecting the Organization and the
Functioning of National Assemblies of People’s Power” (Sobre el perfeccionamiento
de la organización y funcionamiento de los órganos del Poder Popular). The resolution
discussed only procedural aspects of the work of the ANPP.
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that it continued to exist suggested, especially between 1976 and
2008, not so much a problem of theory as a problem of failures of
operationalization. Those failures were either deliberate (the
leadership apparatus was satisfied with the appearance of a
mechanism for popular engagement on a institutional basis and its
propaganda value was great enough), or evidence of a lack of
capacity to transpose theory into the working style of the PCC and
its state apparatus.
Instead, the more difficult problem for a system grounded in
the notions of dictatorship of the proletariat within conditions of
class struggle, and wary of the effects of the forms of liberal
democracy comes from the "left" rather than the right. It is inherent
in the constitution and working style of the PCC itself. Central to
that problem is the role of democratic centralism as a core element
of the way in which the PCC operates, and by extension of the form
of core responsibility PCC members owe the organization in every
aspect of their political work—either within PCC organs, or in their
role in the state apparatus—including the Asamblea Nacional.
What does this mean? First, democratic centralism is an ancient
principle central to the early development of Communist Party
discipline with origins in the writing of Lenin, and then subject to
some variation in its adoption by the Communist Parties of states
worldwide. It provides, broadly, for substantial latitude in debate
within the party (subject to a number of constraints as to time,
place, manner and form that can also be used to eviscerate the
democratic element of the concept in effect), but also the duty of all
Party members of uphold and carry out the decisions of the Party
once debate is ended and a vote taken. It suggests that at least
within the Party, majority voting (in some places the emphasis is
on consensus rather than majority take all voting) determines
policy, but once policy is established or a decision taken then no
deviation is possible, until the next time the issue comes up within
the Party.
Second, the organization of the PCC is grounded on the central
role of democratic centralism in its operation and working style.
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Dicha forma de manifestación encuentra su formulación
en los Estatutos aprobados en el Primer Congreso: “El
Partido Comunista de Cuba se estructura orgánicamente
y funciona de acuerdo con los principios del centralismo
democrático, que permite combinar la más amplia
democracia interna y el examen y análisis colectivo de los
asuntos con la dirección centralizada, la libertad de
discusión con la unidad ideológica, de voluntad, de
organización y de acción de todo el Partido”, en ella se
concreta orgánicamente la disciplina partidista, la
participación política y el papel del dirigente.157
Third, the obligations of democratic centralism extend not just to
obedience by Party members within the Party but also with respect
to their work within state organs.
The Party directs the state, reviews its functioning and its
fulfillment of the outlined directives and plans; it
encourages, moves forward and contributes to the best
work on the part of the entire state mechanism, but under
no circumstances should the Party substitute for the
state . . . . 5. It directs them through Party members who,
regardless of where they work and the position they
occupy, are obligated to fulfill and implement Party
decisions and convince nonmembers of the fairness of
these decisions and the need to follow them. 6. It directs
them through the circumstances—necessary and
inevitable for a long time—whereby the main leaders of

Eursebio Mariano Hernández García, El Principio del Centralismo Democrático en
el Proceso de Construcción y Desarrollo del Partido Comunista de Cuba: Su Relación con
las Concepciones de Vladimir Ilich Lenin y Antonio Gramsci (La Habana: Editorial
Universitaria, 2015), at 67 [This for of manifestation is found in the Statutes
approved by the 1st Congress: The Communist Party of Cuba is organically
structured and functions in accordance with the principles of democratic
centralism, that permits the amalgamation of the broadest form of internal
democracy and the collective examination and analysis of matters with centralized
direction, liberty of discussion within an ideological unity, of good will and of the
organization and action of the entire Party, in which is made organically concrete
party discipline, political participation and the leadership role of the Party.]

157
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the Party, or at least the majority of them, are also the
main leaders of the state.158

Fourth, where a majority of the members of the Asamblea
National are also members of the PCC or its related organs,159 those
members must under core principles of democratic centralism
uphold the decisions of the PCC; they represent the Party and act
in their role as members of the representative vanguard within the
organs of state (and popular) power.
Fifth, as the graphic above and at the start of this post suggest,
the great majority of members of the representative assembly are
subject to the obligations of democratic centralism. If that is the
case, then the Asamblea National can lose its character as the
institution in which the engagement with the masses can be
focused, and rather becomes the site where PCC members may
consider the application of PCC policy decisions through state
organs.
Sixth, in that case, then popular assembly may lose its character
as the site of popular affirmation of PCC policy and decisions. It
becomes something else. That something else in part is as the site
of the transposition of PCC policy and ideology into the concrete
forms of administrative acts. It becomes a legislature. This is not a
surprise—it was so constructed even within the 1976 Constitution.
Seventh, but so reconstituted, the Asamblea National inevitably
loses its character as the site of mass expression—even if limited
under principles of class struggle to the site of proletariat mass
assembly. It becomes both the site of parliamentary legislation (the
rightist turn) as well as the administrative expression of the Party
itself (the leftist turn). The effect is to create an organ of popular
assembly that is itself in reality the expression of the supreme
representative capacity of the Party as the expression of the will of
the proletariat (and thus back to the dictatorship of the proletariat
conception).
Raúl Castro, supra note 149.
See Parlamento Cubano – IX Legislatura, INVENTARIO (Mar. 16, 2019),
https://proyectoinventario.org/parlamento-cuba-ix-legislatura-anpp/.
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Eighth, as a result, there is still a need for some mechanism for
the expression of popular affirmation of the politics and
administrative expression of governance directed by the PCC as
organized vanguard of the Cuban nation. We wind up where we
stared—a Marxist Leninist system in need of a means of a
mechanism for popular affirmation, and a theory of when such acts
of popular affirmation are required.
Ninth, the baseline solution proved ironic as well. The
Reglamentos de la Asamblea Nacional del Poder Popular de la República
de Cuba160 provided two consequential mechanisms for popular
consultation beyond the actions of the Party-in-State apparatus of
the Asamblea National. First, the mechanisms of popular affirmation
are preserved, though now bound by a fairly ambiguous cage of
regulation. Article 4 delegates to the Asamblea the power to hold
popular referenda when required by the constitution or otherwise
at the discretion of the Asamblea.161 Article 80 mandates a
referendum on the adoption of certain changes to the state
constitution.162 Lastly, Art. 110 provides for the conduct of
referenda.163 Second, the Reglamentos add an engagement element
for mass participation (consulta popular) in the process of
operationalization of PCC leadership policies. Article 4(b) invests
the Asamblea with the discretion to seek popular consultation on
its legislative projects.164 Article 5(l) vests the President, vice present
and secretary of the Asamblea the power to propose such
consultation to the Asamblea.165 Article 68(a) vests Asamblea
commissions charged with legislative projects the power to
recommend popular consultation with respect to their work,166 or
by the Asamblea itself.167 (Article 72).
Órgano Oficial Del Comité, Reglamentos de la Asamblea Nacional del Poder
Popular
de
la
República
de
Cuba
(Feb.
2,
2008),
http://www.granma.cu/granmad/2008/02/24/nacional/artic21.html.
161 See id. at art. 4(x).
162 See id. at art. 80.
163 See id. at art. 110.
164 See id. at art. 4(b).
165 See id. at art. 5(i).
166 "[A]probar el proyecto con enmiendas o sin ellas, pudiendo además
recomendar en que período de sesiones debe incluirse y si debe someterse a
consulta popular." Ibid.
167 Id., art. 72.
160
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The irony proceeds from the implications of the solution. First
it reconstructed the mechanisms of the popular consultation from a
revolutionary act of performance to a bureaucratized system for
input and affirmation. We move from the mechanics of the Havana
Declarations, to the performance of voting affirmation. But more
importantly, we move from the performance of the affirmation of acts
wholly undertaken by the proletariat's dictator-representatives (the
form of the organs of the PCC and of the PCC's state apparatus in
the form of the Asamblea Nacional) to a process of partial selfaffirmation by interposing the possibility of consultation between
the PCC's leadership memorialized by the state apparatus in the
form of law or constitution, and popular action.
But in the end, popular participation by affirmation remains
wholly subject to the discretion of the leadership elements of the
political model. And public consultation beyond the Asamblea took
on a wholly discretionary character. It is in the search for a
resolution of these challenges, but only after 2008, that the Cuban
PCC and state apparatus appears to be moving from Socialist
Democracy 1.0 to Socialist Consultative Democracy 2.0, the success
or failures of which are nicely evidenced in the constitutional
reform process of 2016-2019.
What emerges as Cuban Socialist Democracy 2.0 can be seen
in the practices developed after 2011 even in the absence of a
unifying theory that incorporated these practices into the
developing formal expression of the political-economic model of
the PCC. Popular affirmation has been incorporated in three
significant changes to the Cuban political and economic model
since 2011. Consultations were held on the Lineamientos de la
Political Económica y Social del Partido y la Revolución,168 the
Conceptualización del Modelo Económico y Social Cubano de Desarrollo
Socialista, and the Plan de Desarrollo Económico y Social hasta 2030:

Partido Comunista de Cuba, Lineamientos de la política económica y social del
partido y la Revolución Para el Periodo 2016-2021 [Guidelines for the Political
Economy and Social Policy of the Party and the Revolution for the Period 20162021]
(Jul.
2017),
available
at
http://www.granma.cu/file/pdf/gaceta/Lineamientos%2020162021%20Versi%C3%B3n%20Final.pdf.

168
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Visión de la Nación, Ejes y Sectores Estratégicos.169 These consultations
took place in 2001 and 2016. But the extent of affirmation varied—
at their widest with the Lineamientos and at the narrowest with the
much more overtly political Conceptualzación. With the 2019
referendum on the Cuban constitution, popular affirmation
reached its widest scope.
On April 2011, the 6th Congress released the Lineamientos de
la Political Económica y Social del Partido y la Revolución
(Lineamientos).170 The document outlined Cuba’s developmental
strategy for the years 2016-2021. It contained measures meant to
reform the model of economic management; macro-economic
policy; external economic policy; investment; science, technology,
innovation and environment; social policy; agriculture; industry
and energy; tourism; transportation; construction and hydrological
resources; trade. From a modified version of the Lineamientos, in
July 2017171 the 7th Congress of the CPC approved the
Conceptualización del Modelo Económico y Social Cubano de Desarrollo
Socialista, and the Plan de Desarrollo Económico y Social hasta 2030:
Visión de la Nación, Ejes y Sectores Estratégicos.172 The
Conceptualización outlined the principles underpinning the Cuban
economic model, and provided a blueprint for its gradual
transformation. The Plan 2030 was a tool to guide medium-term
economic and social development in Cuba. These reform blueprints
provided the very content of the 2019 constitutional revision.173 Of
the 224 articles in the Project Constitution, 175 are based on the
principles and the policy priorities set by the Conceptualización, the
CONCEPTUALIZACIÓN DEL MODELO ECONÓMICO Y SOCIAL CUBANO DE DESARROLLO
SOCIALISTA
(Jul.
2017),
available
athttp://www.granma.cu/file/pdf/gaceta/Conceptualizaci%C3%B3n%20del%2
0modelo%20economico%20social%20Version%20Final.pdf.
170 See supra note 165.
171 See Partido Comunista de Cuba, Lineamientos de la Política Económica y Social
del Partido y la Revolución Para el Período 2016-2017 (Jul. 2017), available at
http://www.granma.cu/file/pdf/gaceta/Lineamientos%2020162021%20Versi%C3%B3n%20Final.pdf. For an excellent account of
the drafting process of these documents, see Ricardo Torres, El Proceso de
Actualización del Modelo Económico y Social de Cuba, 45 PENSAMIENTO PROPIO 57
(2017).
172 See PLAN NACIONAL DE DESARROLLO ECONÓMICO Y SOCIAL HASTA 2030:
PROPUESTA DE VISIÓN DE LA NACIÓN, EJES Y SECTORES ESTRATÉGICOS (2011).
173 See BACKER, supra note 3.
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Lineamientos and Plan 2030. The amendment of 134 articles
following the popular consultation of 2018 involved a more logical
organization of many of the former provisions, and the rewording
of some of the articles that provoked the most polarization among
the public.
The Lineamientos were discussed in 2011, at assemblies
organized by base-level party committees, labour organizations,
and the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution. A total of
163,000 popular assemblies were held, involving 8.9 million
persons. The consultation lead to re-drafting 68 per cent of the
Lineamientos, and to the addition of 20 reform measures not present
in the first 291-paragraphs version.174 The most debates measures
were those related to the elimination of rationing cards, pricing
policies, transportation, educational and health services and reform
of the monetary system. The figures for those who abstained from
popular assemblies, or else joined without bringing a meaningful
contribution to the discussion are not known. In their absence, no
hypothesis can be formulated on the deeper causes of citizens’ lack
of engagement.
A further round of consultation on a modified version of the
Lineamientos, the Conceptualización and Plan 2030 was held from 15
June to 20 September 2016.175 Over 45,000 meetings were organized,
which by official counts were attended by over 1.5 million
people.176 Virtually all of the meetings were organized by mass
organizations tied to the PCC.177 The proposals made in those
assemblies were sorted, and selected proposals were organized by
See VI Congreso PCC (Congresos del PCC, Compendido Informativo Para
Periodísticas, 2011). http://congresopcc.cip.cu/congresos/vi-congreso-pcc.
175 Comienza Consulta Popular Sobre el Modelo Cubano de Desarrollo, IPSCUBA (June 16,
2016), http://www.ipscuba.net/politica/comienza-consulta-popular-sobre-elmodelo-cubano-de-desarrollo.
176 Raúl Castro a Sesión Extraordinaria del Parlamento. Son Analizados la
Conceptualización del Modelo Económico y Social Cubano de Desarrollo Socialista y los
Lineamientos de la Política del Partido y la Revolución, VANGUARDIA (May 31, 2017),
http://www.vanguardia.cu/de-cuba/9153-raul-castro-a-sesion-extraordinariadel-parlamento.
177 Oscar Sánchez Serra, Ruta democrática y participativa, ASAMBLEA NACIONAL DEL
PODER
POPULAR,
REPÚBLICA
DE
CUBA
(May
30,
2017),
http://www.parlamentocubano.gob.cu/index.php/ruta-democratica-yparticipativa/.
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the Centro de Estudios Sociopolíticos y de Opinión and the Permanent
Commission. Nothing is known, however, about the proposals that
were not accepted, and of the reasons why those proposals were
made.
The reform process launched by the 6th Congress and
continued by the 7th Congress saw three distinct steps.178 Each step
of the reform process was marked by the holding of a popular
consultation on the measures to be implemented. Each one of the
reform packages proposed between 2011 and 2018 saw inputs by
the masses prior to their adoption by the CPC and the ANPP. The
process concluded with the Constitutional referendum of 2019.
Excluding the constitutional referendum, a total of three popular
consultations took place in the narrow space of eight years. This
frequency, breadth and depth of popular engagement in re-making
Cuba’s mode of social and economic development is historically
unprecedented. Apart from the specifics of social and economic
reform, this entire process speaks to the revamping of Cuba’s
socialist democracy, and its reliance on an autonomous and
sustainable version of the “mass line”.
In releasing the Project Constitution to the public, the Cuban
leadership placed quite specific borders on both engagement and
on affirmation. These were grounded on a specific set of
constitutional principles and reforms. These formed the broader
institutional narrative that framed the presentation of the Project
Constitution to the Cuban and global public. The main elements of
this narrative can be extracted from the Introduction to the Analysis

For a longer history of this process, which began in the 1990s, see Jaime García
Ruiz, Reforma de los Noventa y Actualización del Socialismo en Cuba:
Continuidad y Ruptura/Reforms in the 90's and Socialism Updating in Cuba:
Steadiness and Breaking 149 1 REVISTA ECONOMÍA Y DESARROLLO (IMPRESA) 35
(2018) (discussing elements of continuity and discontinuity); Marcos Antonio da
Silva, Cuba: Revolução e Reforma, 10 THE INT’L J. OF CUBAN STUD. 119 (2018).
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of the Project of Constitutional Reform,179 and from the Glossary180
explaining the contextual meaning of key concepts in the
Constitution. They concern the twelve aspects of: the role of the
Communist Party of Cuba in governance; the notion of socialist rule
of law; property rights; guarantees to civil, political, social, cultural
and economic rights; notions about equality; administrative
remedies; citizenship; constitutional equilibria among state organs
at the central level; reforms of the local state; the electoral system;
national security and defense; the process of constitutional
reform.181 These then provided the guidance necessary for officials
moderating the formal meetings at which consultation occurred, 182
as well as shaping the summaries prepared for and limiting the
debates in the Asamblea Nacional. 183
Three differences in content and format exist between the
plebiscitarian meetings of the 1960s, and public consultations of the
2000s, and 2019 Constitutional referendum. First and foremost is
the adoption of modes of consultation based on an informed
popular discussion of governance reforms. The format adopted
involves the publication of draft documents, and their distribution
in both printed and electronic versions. The next step is the
convening of meetings held at grass-roots levels – in schools,
Introducción al Análisis del Proyecto de Constitución de la República Durante la
Consulta Popular, GRANMA (Aug. 21, 2018), http://www.granma.cu/reformaconstitucional/2018-08-21/introduccional-analisis-del-proyecto-deconstitucion-de-la-republica-durante-la-consulta-popular-21-08-2018-18-08.
180 Glosario, in 31 PROYECTO DE CONSTITUCIÓN DE LA REPÚBLICA DE CUBA,
http://www.parlamentocubano.cu/wp-content/uploads/TabloideConstituci%C3%B3n.pdf.
181 Id.
182 Popular meetings about the constitutions were moderated by two “[C]itizens
of proven preparation and honesty” who also prepared the minutes, transcribing
the main points and contents of popular discussion. The organization of popular
meetings has been described by Yeilén Delgado Calvo, ¿Cómo se procesarán las
propuestas derivadas de la consulta popular?, GRANMA (Aug. 10, 2018),
http://www.granma.cu/reforma-constitucional/2018-08-10/como-seprocesaran-las-propuestas-derivadas-de-la-consulta-popular-10-08-2018-19-0814?page=7.
183 Deputies at the ANPP received a summary of the process of popular
consultation, rather than complete data. On this point, see Libia Miranda
Camellón, Yurisander Guevara, Loraine Bosch Taquechel & Abel Rojas Barallobre,
Cobertura Especial: Presentan a los Diputados Resumen del Proceso de Consulta Popular
del Proyecto de Constitución, JUVENTUD REBELDE (Dec. 18, 2018),
http://www.juventudrebelde.cu/cuba/2018-12-18/cobertura- especial.
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hospitals, factories, neighborhoods. Second, is the appreciation of
disagreement, understood as the existence of a variety of opinions
on the specific content of reform blueprints. As stated by Raúl
Castro, processes of consultation that are not unanimous are
“precisely what we need if we really want to reach a democratic
and a serious consultation”.184 Third, is the renewed responsibility
for the Communist Party of Cuba to posit itself as the vanguard of
a more articulated, complex system of popular engagement. For
Cuban socialist democracy, the conventional criticism of popular
consultations grounded on the people’s lack of technical expertise
in governance processes ought to matter little. The gathering and
filtering of popular comments should involve “translating”
valuable ideas expressed through ordinary language into the
technical vocabularies of the respective domains of governance.
The constitution of Cuban Socialist Consultative
Democracy 2.0 thus emerges from practice. It consists of a
coordinated interaction between the state and party organs and the
people under well managed circumstances. Proposals and policies
originate with the PPC, the guiding political vanguard in power. It
is then considered and modified by state and popular
representatives. Only then is it circulated for mass consideration.
But it is circulated; and responses, however well curated, are
transmitted to the authorities. There is evidence that at least within
a narrow band, such popular engagements helped produce
modification.185 The entire process sis overseen by the PCC and
administered through its state apparatus and the mass
This idea was expressed with reference to the popular consultation held on the
Lineamientos, but it can be considered representative of the rhetorical approach of
the Cuban leadership to processes of popular consultation in general. The
complete statement was, “Quiero con esto exponer que, aunque como tendencia
existió en general comprensión y apoyo al contenido de los lineamientos, no hubo
unanimidad ni mucho menos y eso era precisamente lo que necesitábamos, si de
verdad pretendíamos una consulta democrática y seria con el pueblo.” See Informe
Central al VI Congreso del Partido Comunista de Cuba (I), CUBADEBATE (Apr. 17 2011),
http://www.cubadebate.cu/congreso- del-partido-comunista-de-cuba/informecentral-al-vi-congreso-del-partido-comunista-de-cuba-i/.
185 Oscar Figueredo Reinaldo, José Raúl Concepción, Dianet Doimeadios Guerrero,
Edilberto Carmona Tamayo & Irene Pérez, ¿Cuáles son los principales cambios en el
Proyecto de Constitución? (+ Infografía), CUBADEBATE (Dec. 21, 2018),
http://www.cubadebate.cu/especiales/2018/12/21/cuales-son-los-principalescambios-en-el-proyecto-de-constitucion/#.XVsTkFB7nXQ.
184
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organizations constituted by the state and the PCC. Once this
process of popular consultation is finished, the document, policy or
action is finalized by the popular assembly under the guidance and
direction of the PCC. Only then is the action set for popular
affirmation. That combination of an ordered sequence of popular
consultation followed by popular affirmation is the essence of
Cuban Socialist Consultative Democracy 2.0. In form and
appearance it has developed substantially from its first steps in the
early period 1960-1976. But conceptual problems and challenges
remain; and it remains a practice without a theory. Some of the
more fundamental of these issues are discussed in the sections that
follow.

B. The Contradictions of Voting in Cuban Marxist-Leninism;
Situating Popular Assent within an Ideological Cage.
The question worth considering then, is what exactly is the
ideology of voting and of representation at the base of the
construction of the Party and state apparatus after 1975? (Assuming
of course that much has happened since its “big bang” with the 1st
PCC Congress)? What is also worth considering are the related
questions: to what extent does this ideology augment the difficulty
of cross systemic discussion, and then the extent to which it is
worth considering whether the current constitutional project lives
up to its ideological principles in fact? Left for another time is the
harder question: might this ideological system posit a view of
democracy that might itself be legitimately viable in relevant
context.
The development of a Cuban Leninist ideology of voting had
one constant—the leading role of the core revolutionary group that
ousted the pre-1959 government. The manner in which that
leadership role was to be asserted, and how it was to be eventually
institutionalized, proved to be a more uncertain task than might
have been expected. And of course, much of it was undertaken not
from a positive but from a reactive framework; to some extent what
was fashioned was as much a product of U.S. initiatives as it was of
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Cuban reaction.186 Sadly, though, that dynamic has set the pattern
of ideological and institutional development in Cuba that continues
to structure state, government and ideology. Irrespective, by the
middle of the 1970’s the ideological and institutional course had
been set by what had been a more free-form revolutionary
government—it was to embrace some version of orthodox (for its
time and then set in stone) European Marxist-Leninist structure
founded on what would become a more well-defined Caribbean
variation of Marxist ideology.
That leadership role, however, was from the first meant to be
attached to popular participation in some form. What emerged
early on, from 1960, was that this popular participation was to have
little relation to the forms or ideologies of liberal democratic states.
Yet, the revolutionary group's early experiments (or uncharitably
its publicity stunts) have also distinguished its approach to popular
participation from those of other Marxist-Leninist states. Indeed,
and ironically enough, there appeared to be more concern about the
operation of what in China would be called the “mass line” (the
principle of “from the people to the people”)187 in the early period
of the Cuban revolutionary government than there was in more
orthodox Marxist-Leninist states.188 The notion here from the first
The Cuban political line has been built through a series of reactions to the
United States, and to the perceived external environment. The most important
dimensions of this process have been analyzed by MARIA DE LOS ANGELES TORRES,
IN THE LAND OF MIRRORS: CUBAN EXILE POLITICS IN THE UNITED STATES (2001),
discussing the aspect of national security; Myres S. McDougal, The Soviet-Cuban
Quarantine and Self-Defense, 57 AM. J. INT’L L. 597 (1963), examining the impact of
Cold War dynamics on the making of the Cuban regime, and finally PHILIP W.
BONSAL, CUBA, CASTRO, AND THE UNITED STATES (1971) for an exclusive focus on
the relation between the United States and Cuba.
187 See the classical studies by ALAN P. LIU, MASS CAMPAIGNS IN THE PEOPLES
REPUBLIC OF CHINA (1981) (for an illustration of the mass line principle and its
implementation,); see also Arthur H. Steiner, Current “Mass Line” Tactics in
Communist China, 45 AM. POL. SCIENCE REV. 422 (1951).
188 Within the Soviet Bloc, the monopoly on ideological orthodoxy was detained
by the Soviet Union. By the time Cuba was performing experiments in direct
democracy, de-stalinization had already occurred in the Soviet Union, and events
involving mass mobilization no longer took place. Likewise in China, the Cultural
Revolution was coming to an end. See DONALD A. FILTZER, THE KHRUSHCHEV ERA:
DE-STALINIZATION AND THE LIMITS OF REFORM IN THE USSR 1953-64 (1993) (on the
Soviet Union); see also POLLY JONES, THE DILEMMAS OF DE-STALINIZATION (2006) (for
a more recent analysis). For a general study of the cultural revolution, see RODERICK
MACFARQUHAR, THE ORIGINS OF THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION (VOL. 1-3) (1974).
186
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appeared to be to embed popular participation within the structures
of the leadership of the revolutionary government, and thereafter
within those of the Communist Party-State. But until that
leadership structure (and its institutions) was established and
settled, it would be impossible to expect much stability to the
corresponding notions (or practices) of popular participation. That
settlement came with the 1st Communist Party Congress and the
1976 Cuban Constitution and its establishment both of the
institution of the revolutionary government within the Cuban
Communist Party and the institutionalization of popular
participation within the structures of the National Assembly of
Popular Power. The organization of popular participation within
the structures of the National Assembly of Popular Power, the
Cuban Democratic Socialist Model 1.0 described above, however,
tell us little about the ideological character of popular participation.
Moreover, it appears to add a layer of confusion respecting the
forms through which popular participation is manifested. So, let us
try to start at the ideological beginning.
From the time the revolutionary group rolled into Havana in
the early days of 1959, it was confronted with a core ideological
problem—how to remain revolutionary and how to be democratic.
To do both required a considerably long journey away from the
structures of liberal democracy that were even then taking
definitive shape (though they had not yet by any means taken that
definitive orthodox shape then). But it was not clear that the road
would necessarily lead inevitably to an identity with what was
passing for the ideological structures of European MarxistLeninism (already weakened in fact (e.g., Hungary 1956),189 despite
(or because of) a long and intense effort at a theoretical elaboration
of a system that was meant to be profoundly liberal and democratic
(and which in fact was neither).190 On the other hand, MarxistLeninism provided the revolutionary government with the one key
ingredient it needed if it were to try to perpetuate its rule without
appearing (theoretically) to descend into the common mud pit that
See GYOR
̈ GY LITVÁN, JÁNOS M. BAK, AND LYMAN HOWARD LEGTERS, EDS. THE
HUNGARIAN REVOLUTION OF 1956: REFORM, REVOLT AND REPRESSION, 1953-1963
(1996) (on the Hungarian Revolution).
190 See generally KARL POPPER, THE LESSON OF THIS CENTURY: WITH TWO TALKS ON
FREEDOM AND THE DEMOCRATIC STATE (2013) (For all the philosophical and logical
reasons outlined within).
189
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was Latin American dictatorships).191 To that end an ideology was
necessary, and the appearance of an avoidance of a cult of
personality (the caudillo effect so well known within the ancient
boundaries of the old Spanish Imperium). And it needed some
connection with democratic institutions as well, both because the
revolutionary party rode to power in part on that promise, and
because that too might present an avenue for longevity.
The first efforts at the assertion (tightly controlled of course) of
direct democratic authority produced a number of insights. The
first was that the practice or direct democracy tended to serve as an
important method for the management of the direct connection
between the revolutionary government and the people. The second
was that the physical performance of direct democracy was not
then possible, except for extraordinary events. We leave for another
day whether technology has now made possible in cyber spaces
what the revolutionary government attempted to do in physical
space. The third was the development of a distinct view of the
meaning and practice of voting. The fourth was that alternatives
were necessary to develop at least theoretical connections between
the revolutionary government and the people. To that end, the
rudimentary modalities of supervision could also be used as a
means of acquiring information about popular sentiment with
respect to revolutionary government initiatives. The fifth was that
a mechanism was necessary to establish two sets of institutions—
the institutionalization of the revolutionary government and the
institutionalization of popular participation—which required a
further refinement of the meaning and practice of voting. The sixth
was a need to preserve direct popular participation in
extraordinary cases (following the model of the Havana
Declarations). Lastly, the seventh was to be able to distinguish both
voting and participation from its counterparts in liberal democratic
states. To fail to make that distinction was to open the Cuban state
apparatus (and rightly) to the criticism that it was merely creating
showcase institutions and events with no real meaning to cover up

See, e.g., GRETCHEN HELMKE AND STEVEN LEVITSKY EDS. INFORMAL INSTITUTIONS
AND DEMOCRACY: LESSONS FROM LATIN AMERICA (2006) (on Latin American
caudillismo).
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the structures of dictatorship (criticisms that echo strongly in the
Aparicio Otero opinion essay. 192
Reduced to its essence, however, these insights turned, in their
ideological manifestations on two principal elements—voting and
participation of the people. At first glance one might be tempted to
say voting is voting. There can be little ideologically to quibble
about voting except its object. And in that respect both Caribbean
Marxism and liberal democracy agree. Where liberal democracy
sees contests among factions (political parties, for example, but also
interest groups and the like), Caribbean Marxist Leninism sees the
use of voting to mask a dictatorship built along class lines.193
Caribbean Marxist-Leninists, then, view voting as the means by
which the class dominance of (in their view) capitalist elites can be
maintained by providing the appearance of choice and political
clashes over policy while masking that those clashes actually
ensured that the same ruling class continued in power (whatever
the voter's choices among policy options).194 That provided no
choice but reinforced the class corruption at the heart of which was
the voting system that served as the foundation of liberal
democratic practice itself. Thus, to vote for any particular candidate
was to vote for a different mask behind which the same class ruled.
If that was the case, then both the issue of representation and the
issue of voting presented substantial obstacles to popular
participation. For them, the way around the problem involved
three distinct elements.
The first was voting as an act of affirmation or rejection. Voting was
to tie the regulation of voting to the guidance of a revolutionary
party committed (and in theory at least obliged to ensure) that all
actions be drawn to further the fundamental goals of the society. If
that was the case, then voting moved from democratic to corporate
principles—and the revolutionary government (and later the PCC)
transformed itself from a revolutionary system of soviets to a board
Jaime Aparicio Otero, Apariencias Cubanas: La Constitución que se Vota Hoy en la
Isla es Una Obra de Ingeniería Política para Seguir Controlando el Poder, EL PAÍS (Feb.
24,
2019),
https://elpais.com/elpais/2019/02/22/opinion/1550860771_801464.html (last
visited Aug.. 6, 2019).
193 Supra note 51.
194 Castro Ruz, supra note 39.
192
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of directors required to obtain shareholder approval of actions they
initiated. The revolutionary party itself however would be selfregulated, internally responsible only to itself. It would follow that
direct popular participation through voting would be limited to the
purpose of affirming and rejecting the actions put to them for a vote.
In the context of the constitutional plebiscite, the idea would be that
the proposed constitution could be affirmed or rejected by the
voters and if rejected that would signal that the leadership of the
PCC as well as of the people's representatives in the Asamblea del
Poder Popular had also failed in their leadership. In theory that also
ought to produce a crisis of leadership requiring purges of the
leadership group who failed in their responsibilities. At the
margins, limited affirmation should also send strong signals that
the PCC would be obliged to recognize and to which it ought to
respond. But these theoretical possibilities, inherent in emerging
Leninist theories of collective engagement remain largely
unexplored in Cuban theory.195
The second was the voting for the representatives of popular power in
local and national assemblies. Here voting posed the greatest
challenge for the Cuban revolutionary government—how to
distinguish popular voting for representatives to a legislative
national and local assembly for the elections at the heart of liberal
democratic states. Here, again, the idea was to move from the
liberal democratic baseline of voting for one of several competing
candidates, each competing on the basis of personal agendas and
qualifications, to one of affirming the selection by the ruling
leadership of a slate of candidates. Here again, the act of voting is
detached from the act of choosing to the act of affirming a set of
choices made under the guidance of the ruling party. The idea is
that such candidates could be affirmed (elected) and removed by
the people as they liked, but that those choices would be made
At its limit, of course, the issue intersects with the more commonly studied
question of participation and dissidence in socialist states. That does not quite get
to the problem of the obligation of the vanguard in the face of invited popular
expression, though it suggests its contours. See, e.g., Christian Joppke, Revisionism,
Dissidence, Nationalism: Opposition in Leninist Regimes, 45 THE BRITISH J. OF
SOCIOLOGY 543-561 (1994). On Cuba in the last stages of the period of Fidel Castro’s
leadership, see, e.g., RAFAEL HERNANDEZ, MIA A CUBA: ENSAYOSSOBRE CULTURA Y
SOCIEDAD CIVIL [LOOKING AT CUBA: ESSAYS ON CULTURE AND CIVIL SOCIETY]
(Editorial Letras 1999); reviewed in English Jorge I. Dominguez, An Increasingly
Civil Cuba, 120 Foreign Policy Issue 101-102 (Washington Sept./Oct. 2000).
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under the shadow of the overarching obligation by voters and the
PCC to select and retain only those representatives committed to
the economic and political model and the long-term objectives
toward which the state was obliged to move. This makes perfect
sense within a Marxist-Leninist framework, where the fundamental
commitment is to move the state and society toward the goal of
establishing (or in the case of Cuba of preserving specified
elements) of a communist society. The only way around that was
not through elections (this is the case in liberal democracies as well)
but through a revolutionary act that overcomes the basic economic
and political model.
The third was the shifting of the focus of democratic accountability
from voting to participation (within the strict boundaries of the
political and economic model). Voting as affirmation becomes more
palatable (perhaps) when what is to be affirmed is the product of a
substantial amount of popular consultation. It is this thinking that
makes plausible this quote: "Cuban Foreign Minister Bruno
Rodriguez also exercised his right, announcing on Twitter that he
voted for the continuity of the Cuban Revolution. “I defended a
Constitution that is the result of a collective project with a ‘Yes,’
which reaffirms the will of the majority, and which protects the
future of my family and of the heroic people ratifying the
independence and sovereignty of socialist Cuba.”196 Of course that
is true only to the extent that the consultation is deep enough, and
effective enough to warrant public trust. And it will evidence its
tolerance of popular voices by the extent to which it encourages or
acknowledges opinions and suggests inimical to the proffered
guidance. But the theory at least suggests that a comprehensive
enough process for effective consultation that produces changes
invokes a democratic accountability that reduces the centrality of
voting to the construction of democratic mechanisms.197 Of course,
the chasm between theory and practice may be broad. But if there
is a theory that justifies, then the issue changes complexion, at least
in terms of any legitimacy argument.
Cuba Celebra los 55 Años de la II Declaración de La Habana, TELESUR (2017),
https://www.telesurtv.net/news/Cuba-celebra-los-55-anos-de-la-II-declaracionde-La-Habana-20170202-0032.html (last visited Aug. 6, 2019).
197 Larry Catá Backer & Miaoquiang Dai, Socialist Constitutional Democracy in the
Age of Accountability (Oct. 2018) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the
author).
196
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These three theoretical approaches to voting, then, permit a
more rigorous consideration of Cuban practice on its own terms.
Clearly, the core understanding of the role and practice of voting
within the Cuban political model raises significant issues. But it also
suggests that the usual criticism grounded in the deviation between
Cuban practice and the ideal model of liberal democracy also
reduces itself to be a farce. Everyone can agree that Cuba's system
does not conform to the theory or practice of liberal democracy. But
the Cubans would tell you this themselves. If that is all one was
looking for then there is no point in investing any more time in the
matter, and one moves back to the issue of "transition."198 But if
instead we move to the question of the theoretical possibility of
democratic structures in systems grounded in popular affirmation
and consultation, then the issues become far more interesting.
More interesting still are the host of issues around the question:
whether the current constitutional project lives up to its ideological
principles in fact. Within the constitutional project itself the
principal questions ought to go to the extent and value of the
popular consultations, both at the time of the reconceptualization
of the economic and political model before the 7th PCC Congress
and thereafter in the context of constitutional reform. Also
important is the extent to which those consultations are
transparent—for example circulating the public and formal
consultations presented to the National Assembly—it is too late in
the day to claim that this is not possible given the sophistication of
the state's web presence. Lastly, the balloting for the affirmation
and the consequences to those who voted "no" would be of interest.
Related to this is the issue of the state with respect to a failure to
capture a large affirmation.199 How much affirmation is enough to
provoke a review and reform of the proffered text? Yet these are
questions that become possible to consider only once considers the
Jon Mills & Daniel Ryan Koslosky, Whither Communism: A Comparative
Perspective on Constitutionalism in a Postsocialist Cuba, 40 THE GEO. WASH. INT’L L.
REV. 1219, 1229 (2009).
199 Marc Frank & Nelson Acosta, Cubans Expected to Voice Unprecedented Opposition
in
Constitutional
Vote,
REUTERS
(Feb.
21,
2019,
11:12
AM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-cuba-constitution/cubans-expected-tovoice-unprecedented-opposition-in-constitutional-vote-idUSKCN1QA275?il=0
(last visited Aug. 6, 2019).
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possibility that there is an ideological possibility for the
construction of democratic models are do not conform to the
principles of liberal democratic states as these have been refined
since 1945.
The problem of voting, then, touches on a core theoretical issue
in Marxist-Leninist systems. In the absence of a clearly developed
Socialist theory of voting, it is difficult to avoid a drifting back to
the basic principle of liberal democratic orders—that in voting
majorities take all and move on. But if voting is to take a Socialist
character, and if affirmation is directed to the vanguard, then the
relationship of voting to the obligations the voting raises has to be
recast. Voting ought to be better aligned with the fundamental issue
of the responsibilities of a Leninist vanguard. That it has not
suggests a deep challenge for the development of Cuban Socialist
Democracy 2.0. That is captured nicely by the challenge for the
vanguard of confronting negative votes or abstentions.

C. The Caveats.
The constitution of a form of Socialist Consultative Democracy
out of the practices of popular consultation and popular affirmation
raise a number of questions that are still searching for answers.
Beyond the fundamental problem of voting, discussed above, are
first, the problem of engagement; and the second is the problem of
the representation of popular power. Each is briefly considered in
turn.
The problem of engagement is at the core of both liberal
democratic and socialist systems. Engagement can ring as hollow
in both—especially in the face of the management of the process of
engagement by those leadership collectives in control.200 And, of
course, the issues regulatory capture and of barriers to participation
are well known in the West—which explains the great efforts to
conflate democracy and elections and soft pedal the value of
engagement in liberal democratic governance. But for Socialist
systems the problems can be identified with more precision. First,
These systems of hollow engagement are reproduced all the way down the
economic and social order of liberal democracies. See, e.g., Backer, supra note 123.
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the role of the PCC and its management of popular consultation
raises substantial issues. The first is that PCC and state managed
consultation may produce the results desired. In other words that
such management may produce responses that the vanguard wants
to hear rather than those that the vanguard ought to hear; a
problem that mirrors that of liberal democracies.201
The second is a problem of technology.202 The way in which
engagement is undertaken in Cuba bespeaks the 19th rather than the
21st centuries. The continued reliance on mass organizations, and
on the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution suggest a
reliance on physical presence. That reliance makes little sense in
technologically developing states, at least in part in the case of
Cuba. Moreover, the use of particular mechanisms, especially mass
organizations and the like ensure that there will be a certain chilling
effect—similar to that where an employee is asked to be frank about
the shortcomings of the person who can terminate their
employment. Tech and consultation remain in a very early stage of
development, and appeared only in the context of state observed
but less directly managed informal consultations.203 Moreover, the
issues of the Cuban diaspora, and of foreign influences, now at the
forefront of much discussion globally, is hardly on the Cuban radar.
That, in turn, suggests the difficulties of filtering engagement.
Beyond the diaspora, the role of those officials charged with the
collection, summaries and delivery of selected interventions poses
a substantial challenge for decision makers. Filtering without
supervision can substantially distort the process. While that may
produce pleasant results, it will likely also reduce the legitimacy of
the process and therefore its value to the elite.
Problems in surveys of popular opinion and, more generally speaking, other
modes of consultation have been widely analyzed for over four decades by
political scientists in liberal democracies. See Paul Perry, Certain Problems in
Election Survey Methodology, 43 PUBLIC OPINION QUARTERLY 312 (1979). For an
analysis of more recent issues, see Jean-Rémi. Lapaire, Why Content Matters.
Zuckerberg, Vox Media and the Cambridge Analytica Data Leak, 10 ANTARES: LETRAS E
HUMANIDADES 88 (2018).
202 On the relationship between technology and democracy generally, see DANIEL
LEE KLEINMAN, ED. SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND DEMOCRACY (2000).
203 Larry Catá, Backer, Flora Sapio & James Korman, The Democratic Constitution of
Illiberal States—An Empirical Approach to Theorizing Popular Participation,
Representation and Constitutional Reform in Cuba, 34 EMORY INT’L L. REV.
(forthcoming 2019).
201

126

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI INT’L & COMP. L. REV.

Vol. 27:1

The problem of the representation of popular power has yet to
confront the challenges that were built into the system when it was
established after the 1st PCC Congress in 1976. The Asambleas now
appear to be a dual-purpose entity. To some extent, it serves to
implement (and give a stamp of popular interaction) with the acts
of the state and Party apparatus. At the same time, it has been used
largely as a site for capturing popular affirmation in all but the most
important projects. If, in fact, the Asamblea is both the site for
consultation and affirmation, its effects and relation to popular
consultation and affirmation remains to be resolved. But there is no
theory here that may help. As in so many other aspects of political
practice in Cuba—there is much practice in search of a theory, and
much decision making in search of a cage of principles that might
organize, legitimate and constrain the exercise of discretion in
accordance with the political and economic model.
The role of the Asamblea is also complicated by issues of
vertical and horizontal coherence. First, it is not clear how authority
will be divided between the national, provincial and local bodies.204
Second, the role of nomenklatura and Asamblea in the context of
affirmation and consultation remains unclear, all the more so
without an approved theoretical foundation.205 The issue of
representation as between the State, the Asamblea and the PCC
itself also remains both unresolved and dynamic.206 Lastly, there is
a substantial gulf between the role of non PCC members and the
Party which is evidenced in very different ways even among
Constitución
de
La
República
de
Cuba,
http://www.granma.cu/file/pdf/gaceta/Nueva%20Constituci%C3%B3n%2024
0%20KB-1.pdf; Marc Frank, Explainer: What is old and new in Cuba's proposed
constitution (February 21, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-cubaconstitution-explainer/explainer-what-is-old-and-new-in-cubas-proposedconstitution-idUSKCN1QA273.
205 John N. Hazard, The Common Core of Marxian Socialist Constitutions, 19 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 297, 305 (1981) (discussing the theoretical foundation of socialist
constitutions is set in their preamble. All constitutions of the countries belonging
to the former Soviet Bloc follow the constitutional model of the now defunct Soviet
Union. Cuba in not an exception and yet, the Preamble of the 2019 Constitution
makes no mention of the ANPP or of the nomenklatura system).
206 Id. Generally speaking, the reform process that started in Raúl Castro’s era
focused on the economic aspects of governance, neglecting the development of
Caribbean Marxist-Leninist theory.
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Marxist Leninist states. Cuba does not have a United Front
apparatus which is a central element of Chinese governance.207 But
China has less interest in Cuba’s move toward popular
consultation-affirmation mechanisms and the connection to mass
organizations with that process.208 China’s United Front
incorporates popular expression in a different way. The variation
in approach is worth further study.

CONCLUSION
The project of Cuban constitutional reform is not merely about
alignments of normative values and policies between the
government and the vanguard PCC. The revised constitution, and
the three critical documents that have reframed the normative
structures of the Cuban political-economic system—Lineamientos,
Conceptualización, and PNDES—on which it is based, have also
pointed to the substantial development of Cuban practices of
popular engagement. That is, the three have had a substantial effect
on the practice of governance as much as they have had an effect
on the normative content of government.
Popular participation and representation are the great
antipodes of contemporary democratic theory.209 The former
embodies the principle that political power resides in the
individual; the latter that in the exercise of political authority such
power must be delegated and exercised in a fiduciary capacity for
the community of individuals. Yet representative delegation
dilutes popular authority and requires regimes of accountability
beyond elections; but popular control produces majoritarian
A. DOAK BARNETT, CADRES, BUREAUCRACY, AND POLITICAL POWER IN COMMUNIST
CHINA, 198 (1967); ANNE-MARIE BRADY, MARKETING DICTATORSHIP: PROPAGANDA
AND THOUGHT WORK IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA, 25 (Mark Selden eds., (2008).
208 A survey of research article on Cuban politics published in the People’s
Republic of China from 1980 to 2018 revealed that no studies on the referendum
in Cuba have been published. Data were surveyed on the China National
Knowledge Infrastructure Database (CNKI) oversea.cnki.net.
209 See STEPHEN TIERNEY, CONSTITUTIONAL REFERENDUMS: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE
OF REPUBLICAN DELIBERATION (2012) (discussing contemporary democratic theory).
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tyranny if unconstrained. In the construction of mediating
institutions—governments and vanguard institutions mostly—
political communities have drawn on a variety of theories that have
sought to reconcile these core principles in the construction of
government that is accepted as legitimate and thus whose authority
over the polity may be asserted even without individual consent.210
Liberal democracies have moved from the concept of the
embodiment of political self-constitution as incarnated in the body
of a person (the Greek monos arkhein) to its incarnation within the
body (res) of the people (publicus). But that incarnation, as well, has
been situated within vanguard organizations—aristos kratia—the
characteristics of which have undergone tremendous ideological
transformation since the time of the Roman Republic211—with its
most powerful current expressions as liberal republican, Marxist
Leninist vanguardist, transnational multilateralist organization.
Global concern over the shape and direction of democratic
theory and its expression in states have intensified.212 Liberal
democratic states, once comfortably secure in the expression of an
orthodox view of what democracy meant and how it was
expressed, have had those beliefs challenged by internal actions
that appear to challenge the core premises of democratic states—
populism (left and right), foreign interventions, and the increasing
willingness of political actors to test the frontiers of structures and
institutions of government have all appeared to pose significant
threats to the integrity of democratic theory and practice. This has
caused anxiety throughout the democratic world—and certainly
among the intelligentsia in their self-assumed role as guardians of
theory and monitors of the legitimacy of practice. In its most
spectacular forms, this has produced great contests over the
legitimacy of democratic practice—mostly in smaller and more
fragile states. While Venezuela ended 2018 and started 2019 as the
most extreme expression of that anxiety in action, many, in
virtually every other state have become concerned about the state
of democratic theory and practice. In these cases, foreign
Id.
John North, Politics and Aristocracy in the Roman Republic, 85 4 CLASSICAL
PHILOLOGY 277, 277-87 (1990).
212 See generally Nikolaj Nielsen, Brexit Vote Manipulated, Says Data Whistleblower,
EU OBSERVER (Mar. 25, 2018), https://euobserver.com/justice/141470 (examining
concerns over how the democratic “Brexit” vote was carried out).
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interventions and internal instability appear to remind us all of the
dangers of failing to meet the challenges to the stabilizing and
legitimating core of theory and practice.
Despite the sometimes-expressed conceit of contemporary
liberal democratic states that they represent the vanguard and
defenders of orthodox (and therefore legitimate) democratic theory
and its expression, the last several years has seen a more vigorous
and self-conscious development of democratic theory and its
expression in so-called illiberal states, and primarily among certain
states organized around principles of Marxism and Leninism. This
expression of the democratic turn is managed endogenously,
through a mechanics of managed consultation. It is also expressed
exogenously, though a system of carefully controlled referendums.
Both are, in turn available only as an exercise of discretion by the
PCC. That discretion may be exercised in accordance with
principles that have yet to be clearly developed. For both elements
of its Socialist Consultative Democratic model, Cuba was able to
draw on its historical practices to weave together the two elements
of consultation and affirmation. Ironically this suggests a quite
conservative Leninism in the sense of its fidelity to Cuban practices
and political traditions forged between 1959 and 1976. Yet this
remains Leninism without a theory; and it is a conservatism that
tends to be pragmatic and thus unstable and unpredictable.213
As a matter of theoretical possibility, though, the development
of Socialist Consultative Democracy 2.0 within Caribbean Marxism
nicely illustrated in the multi-year efforts of the Cuban state to both
retain its Leninist fundamental organization while developing that
Leninism to provide a more open space for direct intervention of
the collective in the management of the state by its Communist
Party core. In search of an as yet unstable implementation. Cuba’s
leadership “core” has embarked on a multiyear project that started
with the reform at the Party level of the political and economic
model of state organization, the redrawing of the economic plan for
the nation, and in the embedding of these core principles into the
operative documents of the administrative organization of the
state—culminating in the drafting of a new state constitution. In
that context the Party has also sought to develop mechanisms for
213
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popular participation in both the Communist Party's political work,
and in development of mechanisms of popular approval. This
suggests both the possibilities and limits of democratic expression
within Cuban Leninism, and its fundamental incompatibility with
liberal democratic principles of democratic participation.

